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That Congress in enacting section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act authorized the states to adopt "right-to-work" laws banning forms of compulsory unionism otherwise permissable under
federal law has never been -seriously questioned. In this article
the author discusses the more difficult problem of the extent to
which section 14(b) does, or should, enable the states to deal with
union-security issues irrespective of an elaborate federal regulatory
scheme which touches identical or related subject matter.
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

T

WENTY YEARS have passed since Congress, in section 14 (b) of
the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act,' confirmed state power to prohibit compulsory union membership by the adoption of "right-to-work" acts.2 It should be clear to
0 A.B. 1957, Coe College; LL.B. 1961, University of Colorado. Associate Professor of
Law, University of Wyoming.
1 The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), was amended
and supplemented by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964). Section 14 (b) appears at 29 U.S.C. § 164 (b) (1964). Further
amendments, as well as new provisions, were added by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964). Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to the NLRA will include amendments to date.
2Although such laws contain a wide variety of provisions and follow no fixed
pattern, the essential feature of a right-to-work law is the prohibition of the requirement of union membership as a condition of employment. At present nineteen states
have such laws, either in the form of a statute or constitutional provision: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and Wyoming. See 4 LAB. R.L. REP. 1:16-17 (1967) for a table summary and
specific references. Louisiana presently has a law which applies only to agricultural
workers. LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:881-88 (1964). Several states have enacted legislation which restricts, without outlawing, union-security arrangements. E.g., CoLO.
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even the casual observer of this period that right-to-work laws have
failed to occupy the labor-management field to the degree expected by
their proponents. Nor is it likely that the influence of these laws
will increase in the foreseeable future.3 This state of affairs exists
largely because right-to-work legislation is unable to co-exist effectively with a national labor system which enjoys preeminence by reason
of the doctrine of federal preemption. 4 The extent to which state
and private interests embraced within the concept of right-to-work
laws must defer to federal regulatory policies is but one aspect of the
problem. Another aspect involves the broad question of whether the
present distribution of power in the right-to-work area can be defended from the standpoint of a workable labor system. This question is prompted by the observation that, aside from general guidelines which seek to reconcile federal and state power, the practical
impact of right-to-work laws upon national policy cannot be lightly
ignored.
It would appear useful to indicate at the outset the general direction this discussion will take. Though the right-to-work controversy
is emotionally still very much alive, no attempt will be made here
to describe or reconcile the respective positions of the participants in
the conflict.5 By the same token, the wisdom of the decision to
generally exclude state labor law in areas subject to federal regulaFor
(1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.06(1) (c) (1) (1957).
general background see F. MEYERS, RIGHT TO WORK IN PRACTICE (1959); Pollitt, Right
to Work Law Issues: An Evidentiary Approach, 37 N.C.L. REv. 233 (1959); Tcple, A
Closer Look at "Right to Work" Legislation, 9 W. RES. L. REv. 5 (1957).
aThe efforts of the National Right-to-Work Committee to secure the adoption of
right-to-work acts in other states have generally not been successful in recent years.
The last state to enact a right-to-work law was Wyoming in 1963. Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§§ 27-245.1-.8 (Supp. 1965). The most recent state legislative activity with respect to the
right-to-work issue is the repeal by Indiana of its law in 1965. Ind. Acts of 1965, ch. 1,
§ 1. The Teal flood of state legislation restricting compulsory unionism occurred in the
immediate post-war years, particularly 1947. See H. MiuLIs & E. BROWN, FROM THE
WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 326-29 (1950).
'The constitutional basis of federal regulation of labor relations is the commerce
clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Laws enacted by Congress pursuant to this authority are
anything
declared, by the supremacy clause, to be "the supreme law of the land ....
in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT.
art. VI, § 2. The doctrine of federal preemption, therefore, rests on the simple proposition that once Congress enacts legislation which expressly or impliedly covers a subject, state authority must yield. See generally Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor
Relations, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1297, 1298-1300 (1954). See notes 25-29 infra and accompanying text.
The merits of the right-to-work issue are analyzed in P. SULTAN, RIGHT-To-WORK
REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-4-6 (1) (d)
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tion is not in issue." The contemporary scheme of labor regulation
may not constitute the best of all possible worlds, but it is at least
a possible one. More importantly, there is little evidence that the
movement toward national control of the labor-management relation will be either reversed or diverted. Thus one of the basic
premises upon which this discussion proceeds is that Congress has
established a national labor policy which carries obvious implications
of exclusive federal authority. Nevertheless, the most meaningful
objection to a comprehensive application of federal power is that
state power is obliterated without regard to whether state intervention actually obstructs federal policy in a concrete case.1 If in fact
the content and application of right-to-work legislation entails a
substantially high risk of derangement of basic federal objectives, the
argument for a balancing of federal-state interests on a case-by-case
basis loses much of its appeal. The effect of right-to-work acts must
therefore be tested against the backdrop of national purposes and
objectives inferable from federal legislation.
The enlargement of the power of one regulatory system inevitably creates jurisdictional tensions with competing systems. In
the enactment of the NLRA in 1935 Congress took firm hold of the
processes of employee organization and collective bargaining s and
thereby established a legislative pattern in the direction of nationalization of labor relations. The Supreme Court at an early date left
little doubt about congressional power to superimpose federal upon
state law in the labor-management field.9 Consequently, the trend
of national control was accelerated in the major legislative revisions
6 The policy considerations underlying preemption of state competence to act in
labor matters are discussed in Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the
October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REV. 1057 (1958); Gregory, Federal or State Control of
Concerted Union Activities, 46 VA. L. REv. 539 (1960); Meltzer, The Supreme Court,
Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations (pt. I), 59 COLuM. L. REv. 6
(1959); and Wollett, State Power to Regulate Labor Relations-Major Developments
During the Supreme Court's 1957-58 Term, 33 WASH. L. REV. 364 (1958).
7 See, e.g., Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74
HAZv. L. REv. 641, 650-51 (1961). See notes 25-29 infra and accompanying text.
a Section 7 of the Wagner Act expressly recognized the right of employees to
organize into unions, bargain collectively, and "engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1964). Certain practices of employers thought to interfere with the
exercise of employee rights were condemned in § 8. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
The constitutionality of the Wagner Act was upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), which broadly defined congressional power to legislate
with respect to local labor activities which disturb interstate commerce. Cf. NLRB v.
Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
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of the NLRA in 1947 and 1959, revisions which swept federal power
into virtually every aspect of collective bargaining. 10 The rough
guarantees of employee organizational rights contained in the original
NLRA were accordingly transfonned into a vast and comprehensive
code of rights and duties"1 directed in part toward concerted employee
2
activities, an area traditionally subject to local control.' The result
was a recurring series of disputes as to which system, federal or state,
should regulate the highly volatile subject of union economic power.
Defining the limits of state power generated by right-to-work
statutes is merely one phase of the continuous process of gauging the
extent to which federal presence displaces local authority. In the
area of "union security,"' 3 however, additional difficulties exist because Congress chose not to be consistent in its over-all objective of
a uniform labor policy. The failure of the NLRA to either sanction
or prohibit the closed shop or the union shop was understandably
10
Twelve years after the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, Congress added the LaborManagement Repoiting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
The principal significance of the LMRDA is that it represents the first congressional
effort at regulating internal union government. In addition, the LMRDA made a
number of important amendments to the NLRA, primarily in connection with union
unfair labor practice provisions.
"'In its present amended form, § 8 of the NLRA enumerates specific unfair labor
practices by unions as well as employers, and spells out the affirmative duties of collective bargaining. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). Section 7 presently provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities ... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
12 Not until the Taft-Hartley Act did federal law attempt to regulate the exercise
of union economic pressures on employees and employers. Strikes, boycotts, and picketing, if regulated at all prior to 1947, were subjects of state concern exclusively. See
generally Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdictionover Labor Relations, 46
Micff. L. REv. 593 (1948).
18The term "union-security" describes a variety of arrangements, usually contractual,
whereby union membership is made a condition of employment. The traditional types
of clauses include: (1) the closed shop, which permits the hiring only of members of the
appropriate union; (2) the full union shop, under which all employees must join the
union within a certain period, typically within 80 days of hiring; (3)the modified
union shop, which allows new members to withdraw from membership at stated periods,
or exempts old employees who are not members; (4) maintenance of membership, which
imposes no membership requirement, but does require employees who join the union
to continue their membership; and (5) the agency shop, which requires non-union
employees to pay to the union a sum equal to fees and dues paid by members. Hiring
arrangements designed to protect or favor union members in securing jobs are often
referred to as forms of union-security, as is the "checkoff," a device whereby the employer makes a deduction from the paychecks of employees and transmits amounts so
deducted to the union. See generally LAB. REL. RE'. (LRX) 643 (1967).
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accepted as federal recognition that compulsory unionism was a
matter of state law. 14 It was therefore not unexpected that a number
of states, beginning with Florida in 1944, should proceed to regulate
union-security through the enactment of right-to-work laws,15 or that
such laws would successfully resist challenge on federal as well as
state grounds.' 6
The federal attitude toward union-security, however, was drastically altered in the Taft-Hartley Act. Rather than restricting all
forms of union-security arrangements, Congress in section 8 (a) (3)
expressly permitted agreements conditioning employment upon
union membership in specified situations.17 The effect was to outlaw
the closed shop, but approve the union shop which complies with
federal standards."" Simultaneously, the power of a union to use the
membership obligation as a basis for affecting employment was narrowly circumscribed.' 9 Yet having entered the union-security area,
14

Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act left open state power to prohibit or regulate

union-security agreements by declaring that nothing in federal law shall preclude

the making of such agreements so long as the union was a proper representative of
a group of employees.

Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 8 (3), 49 Stat. 452, as amended,

29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1964).
15 Laws banning any and all forms of union-security contracts had been enacted in
twelve states by the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments. A summary of the status of
state legislation on union-security at that time appears at 21 L.R.R.M. 66-68 (1948).
16 The constitutionality of state right-to-work laws was sustained against due process
objections in Plumbers Local 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); AFL v. American Sash
& Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949); and Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). Such laws have usually been found not to offend state
constitutions. E.g., Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872 (1949).
"T Section 8 (a) (3) declares that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
" 2.9
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ..
U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1964). The first proviso to that section, however, permits unionsecurity in the following circumstances: "Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any
other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the
appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii)
unless following an election held as provided in section 9 (e) within one year preceding
the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the
" Id.
authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement ....
's The ban of the closed shop results from the requirement of pre-existing union
membership, whereas the membership obligation in a union shop clause is incurred
subsequent to the securing of employment. See note 13 supra.
as The second proviso to § 8 (a) (3) reads as follows: "Provided further, That no
employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for non-membership in
a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such member-
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Congress did not commit the field exclusively to federal regulation.
In section 14 (b) it gave express recognition to local interests and
sought to preserve to the states an area within which right-to-work
laws might operate:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State
or Territorial law.20
In enacting section 14 (b), Congress was free to preempt as much
or as little of the subject matter of union-security as it desired. 21 That
it authorized the states to ban any form of compulsory unionism
22
which federal law might accept has never been seriously questioned.
Beyond this threshold premise, the dividing line between federal and
state power becomes dim and obscure. If federal and state restrictions
apply concurrently in businesses affecting commerce, 23 the Taft-Hartship was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally
applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (1964).
If a labor organization or its agent attempts to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of § 8 (a) (3), this constitutes an unfair labor practice.
under § 8 (b) (2). 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(2) (1964). The practical effect of these provisions
is to limit the burdens of membership upon which employment may be conditioned to
the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. In other words, as long as an employee subject to a union shop agreement tenders required dues and fees, he may ignore
all other union-imposed obligations and still not be discharged for non-membership
even though he is not a formal member. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
17 (1954); Kingston Cake Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1445 (1952); Union Starch & Ref. Co. v.
NLRB, 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
815 (1951). Section 8(b) (5) further protects employees subject to a union-shop agreement by prohibiting excessive or discriminatory membership fees. 29 US.C. § 158 (b) (5)

(1964).

2o29
2

U.S.C. § 164 (b) (1964).

'In 1951 Congress amended the Railway Labor Act to permit union shop agreements in the railroad and airline industries "notwithstanding any . . . provisions" of
state law. Railway Labor Act § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964). As a result, right-to-work laws
have no validity in industries subject to that Act. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson,

351 U.S. 225 (1956).

22 See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
The Supreme Court, in the
first case dealing with § 14 (b), construed that section as leaving the states "free to pursue
their own more restrictive policies in the matter of union-security agreements."
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301,
313-14 (1949).

23 It is generally understood that the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) over industries "affecting" commerce is coextensive with congressional
power to legislate under the commerce clause. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp.,
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ley alteration of federal policy relating to the union-security issue
would be nullified. The source of the difficulty is that having
abandoned the policy of uniformity in favor of one of shared
authority, Congress afforded little guidance as to the nature of state
power that is to exist alongside an increasingly dynamic federal
power. 24 The mere fact that in section 14 (b) Congress approved
state competence in union-security matters is not conclusive of its
legislative purposes. The meaningful question is the extent to which
section 14 (b) does or should enable the states to deal with unionsecurity irrespective of the elaborate and predominant federal scheme
which touches identical or related subject matter. The device for
resolving this question is the one employed to accommodate federal
and state jurisdiction of any subject of labor relations, namely, the
doctrine of preemption.
According to the blackletter law of preemption as articulated by
the landmark 1959 decision in San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon, "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of
the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board. ... 25
371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963). The Board, however, primarily for budgetary reasons, has
declined to act in cases where the effect on commerce is minimal or remote. The
decision to exercise jurisdiction is currently based on monetary standards or "yardsticks," stated in terms of the dollar volume of sales and purchases of specific enterprises, announced by the Board in 1958. See 23 NLRB Ann. Rep. 8 (1958). Under
§ 14 (c) of the NLRA, added by the 1959 LMRDA amendments, the states are permitted
to assume jurisdiction over disputes which the Board, pursuant to authority granted
by that section, declines to hear because of an insubstantial effect on commerce. 29
U.S.C. § 164(c) (1964). State right-to-work laws are therefore clearly applicable in
cases where commerce is not affected, as well as in cases which affect commerce but not
sufficiently to satisfy the Board's jurisdictional standards. See Radio Technicians Local
1264 v. Broadcast Serv., Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965); Aaron, The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1097-98 (1960). The
unsettled question is the extent to which § 14 (b) permits right-to-work laws to operate
in cases over which the Board would customarily exercise jurisdiction. In discussing
state decisional law herein, some cases not within NLRB jurisdiction will be included
since they are descriptive of state regulatory trends and are therefore relevant to the
matter of preemption. Primary emphasis, however, will be given state right-to-work
decisions which directly confront preemption doctrine.
21 Even though the implications of preemption became obvious shortly after the
enactment of § 14 (b), Congress has addressed itself to only one narrow aspect of preemption since Taft-Hartley, namely, the § 14 (c) question of whether the states may act
with respect to labor disputes over which the NLRB has, but declines to assert, jurisdiciton. And in treating this problem, the net effect of congressional action was to
stamp with approval the line of Supreme Court decisions calling for a general retreat
of state power in the labor field. Aaron, supra note 23, at 1094.
"5 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). The extensive Garrnon litgiation involved a state court
injunction and award of damages growing out of the peaceful picketing of an inter-
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The rationale of Garmon is readily apparent: the broad powers conferred upon the Labor Board to interpret and enforce the complex
federal law of labor relations necessarily imply that potentially conflicting rules, remedies, or administrative practices cannot be permitted to operate because of the danger of impairment of national
labor policy.26 Hence, with few exceptions, 27 neither state nor federal
state employer for purposes alleged by the picketing unions to be organizational in
nature. When the case first reached the Supreme Court, injunctive relief was struck
down on the theory that a state may not enjoin conduct subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 353 U.S. 26 (1957); cf. Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats,
Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). When
the case came back to the Court two years later for consideration of the question of
power to award damages for economic injuries resulting from the picketing, state jurisdiction was required to yield because of the danger of conflict with federal policymaking power. 359 U.S. at 247. The principal significance of Garmon is that it elevated preemption rules of earlier cases into a self-contained doctrine of sweeping
deference to federal policy. The importance of the decision is indicated by the large
body of literature it has engendered. E.g., Gould, The Garmon Case: Decline and
Threshold of "Litigating Elucidation," 39 U. DEr. L.J. 539 (1962); Gregory, supra note
6; Hanley, Federal-StateJurisdiction in Labor's No Man's Land: 1960, 48 GEo. L.J. 709
(1960); McCoid, Notes on a "G-String": A Study of the "No Man's Land" of Labor Law,
44 MINN. L. REv. 205 (1959); Michelman, supra note 7; Wellington, Labor and the
Federal System, 26 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 542 (1959). A summary of preemption cases preceding Garmon appears in the Court's opinion in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348
U.S. 468, 474-77 (1955).
26 Perhaps the best statement of the reasoning which ultimately produced Garmon
is to be found in Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953): "Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal
competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary
interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal
and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and
Congress evidently considered that centralized administrahearing and decision ....
tion of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of
its substantive rules ... . A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures
are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different
rules of substantive law."
27 It should not be overlooked that preemption does contemplate some degree of
diffusion of power. In Garmon the Supreme Court recognized that preemption would
be inoperative where labor activity is merely of "peripheral concern" of the NLRA or
touches interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." 359 U.S. at 243-44.
An overriding state interest has traditionally been found to exist in cases involving intimidation, violence, or a threat to public order. E.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634
(1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Electrical Workers Local 111 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942). Other than cases having
some relation to domestic peace, however, the judicial exceptions to preemption
have not been extensive. For example, state remedies have been permitted in connection with such varied subjects as a union's breach of its statutory duty of fair representation, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); malicious libel, Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); and wrongful expulsion from union
membership, Machinists Union v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). See also Hanna Mining
Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965); Incres S.S. Co. v. Maritime
Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963).
Congress has, in addition, carved out some specific exceptions to exclusive NLRB
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courts may assert jurisdiction over labor activity which reasonably
appears within the coverage of the NLRA, either as protected or prohibited conduct. 28 In order to insure that matters subject to federal
law actually reach the specialized hands of the Labor Board without
state interference, initial and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether conduct falls within preempted categories is entrusted to
29
the Board itself.

Since Congress has undertaken explicit regulation of unionsecurity in section 8 (a) (3), labor activities involving the conditioning
of employment upon union membership may be "arguably subject"
to the protections or prohibitions of the NLRA. Yet section 14 (b)
gives express recognition to state power to deal with such matters.
jurisdiction. For example, section 301 (a) of the NLRA provides that suits for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement may be brought in a federal court without regard
to diversity of citizenship or the amount in controversy. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (194).
Preemption doctrine has been held not to preclude a suit in a state court under § 301
where the contract breach is concededly within the unfair labor practice jurisdiction
of the NLRB. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). The application of
preemption to suits on collective agreements is analyzed in Sovern, Section 301 and the
Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HAv. L. Rxv. 529 (1965). In addition to § 301,
violations of the secondary-boycott provisions of § 8(b) (4) are expressly made subject
to damage actions in the courts by § 303 of the NLRA even though such practices are
subject to Board jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
28 The broad language of § 7 of the NLRA protects from employer reprisals a wide
range of concerted employee activities. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964); see, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). Similarly, it has long been established that
a state may not impose restrictions upon labor activities protected by federal law.
Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). The guarantees of § 7 are in
turn federally implemented by specific prohibitions of employer and union conduct in
§ 8. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). In addition to conduct arguably protected or prohibited
by federal law, Garmon made clear that certain activity may in fact be "neither
protected nor prohibited" and still not subject to state regulation. 359 U.S. at 245.
But see UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
The Supreme Court has recently confirmed that state regulation of activities neither
federally protected nor prohibited is ousted where circumstances warrant the application of preemption doctrine. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258-60
(1964). Given the mechanics of the "arguably subject" test, few preemption cases can
be expected to arise in which there is a ciear determination by the NLRB that an
activity is neither protected nor prohibited. But see Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2,
Marine Eng'rs Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965).
29 The crux of preemption doctrine is that the NLRB is entitled to the first
opportunity to regulate a labor dispute which appears within the coverage of federal
law. The judicial function is therefore limited: "We need not and should not now
consider whether the . . . activity in this case was federally protected or prohibited, on
any of the theories suggested above or on some different basis. It is sufficient . . . to
find, as we do, that it is reasonably 'arguable' that the matter comes within the Board's
jurisdiction." Plumbers' Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696 (1963). If a case
presents a situation where "essentially undisputed facts" are subject to "compelling
precedent," Garmon indicated that a court may act in the absence of a prior Labor
Board determination. 359 U.S. at 246; cf. Ex parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962).
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Nevertheless, assuming that preemption does not oust the states of
power under section 14 (b) to prescribe and enforce their own policies
of union-security, these local policies must still be reconciled with
federal policies which explain the necessity for a doctrine of preemption in the first place.
In 1963 the Supreme Court for the first time elected to engage
in a discussion of the unique problems posed by the application of
preemption to state jurisdiction arising from section 14 (b). The
0 in which the
case of Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn,3
Court wrote two opinions (Schermerhorn I and Schermerhorn 11),
presented the question of whether Florida courts had jurisdiction to
enjoin the enforcement of a union-security agreement prohibited by
the Florida right-to-work act.8 1 As a result of section 14 (b), the
Supreme Court acknowledged that "there will arise a wide variety
of situations presenting problems of accommodation of state and
federal jurisdiction in the union-security field."3 2 In making the
accommodation in the immediate case, it was decisive to the Court
that Congress, by the inclusion of section 14 (b), had left the states
free to legislate with respect to union-security even to the extent of
outlawing arrangements which satisfied federal standards. 38 Since
state policy was accorded such a high priority, the Court concluded
that state tribunals possessed jurisdiction to implement that policy,3 4
at least to the extent of enjoining an executed union-security clause.
80

The first opinion appears at 373 U.S. 746 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as
Schermerhorn 1], and the second is reported at 375 U.S. 96 (1963) [hereinafter referred
to as Schermerhorn 11].
31
The Florida Supreme Court had found that an agency shop clause in a collective
agreement was forbidden by the right-to-work provision of the state consitution, and
that the Florida courts could enforce the prohibition in an injuction procceding.
Schermerhorn v. Retail Clerks Local 1625, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962). In Schermerhorn
I the Supreme Court agreed that the union-security agreement in question was within § 14 (b) and therefore subject to prohibition by Florida law. 373 U.S. at 752. The
issue left for consideration in Schermerhorn I was "whether the Florida courts, rather
than solely the National Labor Relations Board, are tribunals with jurisdiction to
enforce the State's prohibition" of a union-security agreement. 375 U.S. at 97-98.
82 375 U.S. at 105.
8
1,"Yet even if the . . . agreement clears all federal hurdles, the States by reason
of § 14 (b) have the final say and may outlaw it. There is thus conflict between state
and federal law; but it is a conflict sanctioned by Congress with directions to give the
right of way to state laws .... " Id. at 102-03.
31 The union had taken the position that the execution or application of a unionsecurity agreement in violation of a right-to-work law is arguably an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, and therefore only the NLRB may afford relief. 375 U.S. at 103.
The argument assumes that the only effect of § 14 (b) is to remove the protection of
the § 8 (a) (3) proviso in right-to-work states, with the result that the conditioning of
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Having already found in Schermerhorn I that section 14 (b) subjected the agreement in question to state substantive law,3 5 the conclusion that Congress must have intended that the states have jurisdiction to enforce the prohibitions of local law was practically
irresistible. To have concluded otherwise would give credence to
the somewhat startling proposition that preemption demands greater
uniformity in the area of union-security, section 14 (b) notwithstanding, than in the general field of labor relations. It would have also
meant that the Labor Board is required to effectuate the diverse
policies reflected in the complex pattern of right-to-work legislation.
Thus, by way of analogy, the Court reinforced the principle of nonuniformity in section 14 (b) by reaffirming its previous holding in
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Company v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,386 to the effect that a state may reinstate with back pay
an employee discharged pursuant to a collective agreement which
violates a local union-security law.
The effect of the Schermerhorn litigation is to confirm that
section 14 (b) shelters state right-to-work laws from the full impact
of preemption. The facts of that case, however, afforded the Supreme
Court little more than an opportunity to sketch the boundaries of
the immunity in broad outline. The controlling factor was the
existence of a written union-security agreement which by its terms
was subject to state prohibition. Absent such an agreement, conduct
arguably proscribed by the NLRA, even though involving unionsecurity, would be a matter exclusively for the Labor Board under
standard preemption doctrine.3 7 This result obtains because the
regulatory scheme designed by Congress contemplates that "state
power, recognized by § 14 (b), begins only with actual negotiation
38
and execution of the type of agreement described by § 14(b)." 1
Thus, activities occurring prior to actual execution of a unionsecurity agreement, whether or not they violate a right-to-work law,
lie exclusively in the federal domain.
It should be apparent at this point that the effectiveness of a
employment upon membership is an unfair labor practice under §§ 8 (a) (1), 8 (a) (3),
and 8 (b) (2). The Court rejected the argument on the basis of the wording and legislative history of § 14(b). 375 U.S. at 103. The incorporation of § 14(b) into § 8(a) (3)
is urged in 17 STAN. L. REV. 158 (1964).
85 See notes 82-83 infra and accompanying text.
88 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
27 375 U.S. at 105.
28Id.(emphasis in original).
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labor policy of union-security is in large measure dependent upon the
manner in which state courts reconcile preemption doctrine with
state enforcement powers claiming legitimacy under section 14 (b).
Although Schermerhorn I1 does recognize state jurisdiction in a
situation where, absent section 14 (b), preemption would control, it
should be emphasized that the decision is in fact authority for an
extremely narrow breach in the wall of preemption. More importantly, it must be recognized that Schermerhorn II does not purport to chart a dividing line between federal and state power which
will resolve all questions arising from right-to-work laws. 0 Unless
the distribution of union-security power is understood and accepted,
a duplication and conflict of remedies will result. But even
assuming that controlling legal principles can be further clarified,
there still remain a number of practical impediments to the orderly
implementation of the concept of concurrent jurisdiction reflected
in section 14 (b). To these matters, which crystallize the critical
role of state courts, we now turn.
FEDERALISM AND THE REALITIES OF SECTION

14 (b)

Underlying the theory of preemption in the labor field is the
basic assumption that courts are ill-equipped to engage in an ad
hoc inquiry into the precise nature and degree of federal-state conflict in each labor dispute. Thus, as Garmon made clear, the function of preemption is to delimit "areas of potential conflict" by dealing with "classes of situations" rather than to attempt to balance
relative interests in the circumstances of a given case. 40 As a matter
of mechanics, the "arguably subject" test simply reflects the judgment
that it is desirable to leave to the National Labor Relations Board
initial determination of the status of doubtful conduct under federal
law. Aside from the stated ground rules of preemption, however, the
sheer proximity of a state court to a labor dispute has always entailed
the risk that local courts will assert the power to categorize activity on
41 If
the merits in order to decide whether they have jurisdiction.
89 The Supreme Court has decided only one preemption case involving right-to-work

issues since Schermerhorn, and on that occasion the Court failed to enlarge upon the
limited nature of state power under § 14 (b). See note 101 infra.
40359 U.S. at 242.

"1See Hays, State Courts and FederalPreemption, 23 Mo. L. Rav. 378, 374-76 (1958).
The risk of premature state action permeates the whole labor field. Even since Garmon

there have been a substantial number of occasions on which state courts have acted
with respect to conduct arguably subject to exclusive NLRB jurisdiction. E.g., Liner
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courts decide for themselves whether or not the subject matter of a
lawsuit has been withdrawn from state concern, as a practical matter
they are resolving the question of preemption in the first instance.
When the assertion of state jurisdiction is grounded on a rightto-work law, the preemptive rule of self-restraint operates in a somewhat different fashion. The Schermerhorn litigation illustrates the
point. The highest court of Florida ruled that its courts could deal
with the question of the status of an agency shop clause under section 14 (b) without prior Board action.4 Although the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court articulated express limitations on
the permissible area of state jurisdiction, inherent in the actual holding of Schermerhorn I is the proposition that a state court may
initially determine whether a particular union-security agreement
complies with state substantive law enacted pursuant to section
14 (b).43

Moreover, if the agreement is found to violate state law,

Schermerhorn II in effect says that a local court is empowered to
enforce the law and afford a remedy for the violation. It follows
that where section 14 (b) is concerned, the power of a state court to
initially assess activity relating to union-security arrangements is not
confined to the "arguably subject" standard of Garmon. Even
v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964). In the right-to-work area, courts have frequently
adjudicated a labor controversy in the face of preemption argument. E.g., Carpenters
Local 225 v. Briggs, 218 Ga. 742, 130 S.E.2d 707 (1963). The temptation to explore the
question of actual conflict between federal and state law is apparently difficult to resist.
See, e.g., Kimbrell v. Jolog Sportswear, Inc., 239 S.C. 415, 123 S.E.2d 524 (1962). The
approach which results in hasty state action is suggested by the following statement:
"When a suit upon a matter of labor relations is brought in a state court and the
court's jurisdiction is denied, the court must determine the question for itself. It
cannot stop and refer the question to the board ... .
Farnsworth & Chambers Co.
v. Electrical Workers Local 429, 201 Tenn. 329, 334, 229 S.W.2d 8, 10, rev'd per curiam,
353 U.S. 969 (1957). For a clear statement of the procedure to be followed with respect
to the preeemption defense see Mitcham v. Ark-La. Constr. Co., 239 Ark. 1162, 397
S.W.2d 789 (1965).
42 Schermerhorn v. Retail Clerks Local 1625, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962). The preemption argument was made in the trial court, but the action was dismissed on the
ground that the agreement on its face was not in conflict with the right-to-work law.
Schermerhorn v. Retail Clerks Local 1625, 47 L.R.R.M. 2300 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1960). The
preemption argument was renewed in the Florida Supreme Court, but expressly rejected. 141 So. 2d at 274-75.
"Although the Supreme Court held that the legality of the clause in question "is
governed by the decision of the Florida Supreme Court under review here," 373 U.S. at
757, the Court did concede that "in all probability the preemption issue was entitled
to different treatment than it received in the Flordia courts ......
Id. at 755. The
Court did not press the issue since, in the interim, both the Court and the Board had
taken positions on the status of an agency shop under § 14(b) consistent with the
disposition made by the Florida Supreme Court. 373 U.S. at 755-57.
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though the arrangement is clearly or potentially subject to federal
law, the states may apparently decide for themselves whether section
14 (b) subordinates federal law to local policy.
The enlargement of state power to assess union-security arrangements facilitates the application of state law in situations not contemplated by section 14 (b). Where commerce is affected, state jurisdiction is solely dependent upon this section of the NLRA. It
should not be surprising, then, that the state decisions reveal a tendency to lift section 14 (b) from its federal context, isolate it from
preemption doctrine, and pursue primarily the question whether
44
the conduct at hand is governed by the letter or spirit of local law.
Preoccupation with the fact that Congress left the states free to legislate with respect to union-security tends to obscure the total framework of federal law.45 As a result, the attention of a state court is
likely to be diverted from the threshold issue of whether conduct
falls within a preempted category, section 14 (b) notwithstanding.
That this risk is more than theoretical is evidenced by state decisions
which fail even to reach the preemption issue, 46 or do so only after
establishing a basis for state jurisdiction.47 Aside from the sound"The importance placed on the issue of whether conduct actually violates rightto-work policy is evidenced by the extensive treatment it receives in many state court
opinions as compared to the preemption issue. See, e.g., Minor v. Building & Constr.
Trades Council, 75 N.W.2d 189 (N.D. 1956) (one of the earlier cases raising preemption
in a right-to-work setting). See also Alabama Highway Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Local
612, 268 Ala. 392, 399-400, 108 So. 2d 350, 356-57 (1959); Taylor v. Engineers Local 101,
189 Kan. 137, 368 P.2d 8 (1962); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Electrical Workers Local
755, 246 N.C. 481, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957); Texas State Fed'n of Labor v. Brown & Root,
Inc., 246 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
,5 In Scherer & Sons, Inc. v. Ladies' Garment Workers Local 415, 142 So. 2d 290, 295

(Fla. 1962), the court alluded to the preemption problem, but dismissed it with the
following statement: "In the area of protecting state policy under right-to-work provisions the Congress has expressly ceded initial jurisdiction to the states." Cf. Mitcham
v. Ark-La. Constr. Co., 239 Ark. 1162, 1175-77, 397 S.W.2d 789, 796-97 (1965) (dissenting
opinion).
do For example, in Branham v. Miller Elec. Co., 237 S.C. 540, 118 S.E.2d 167 (1961),

the preemption argument was raised in the trial court, but the action was dismissed
on another ground. The state supreme court reversed upon finding the complaint
stated a violation of a right-to-work act, but refused to consider the issue of exclusive
federal jurisdiction because it had not been passed on below. The treatment of the
issue of jurisdiction on a motion for a temporary restraining order under a right-to-work
law is illustrated in Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v.
Hod Carriers Local 18, 49 L.R.R.M. 2187 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1961). Compare NLRB v.
Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966).
ATSee, e.g., J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 755, 246 N.C. 481, 98
S.E.2d 852 (1957); Kimbrell v. Jolog Sportswear, Inc., 239 S.C. 415, 123 S.E.2d 524
(1962); Pruitt v. Lambert, 41 L.R.R.M. 2369 (Tenn. Ch. 1957).
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ness of such determinations, the opportunities for effectuation of
right-to-work policy at the earliest stages of a labor controversy are

indeed real. 48

And since a right-to-work dispute rarely begins in

any tribunal other than a state court, the cumulative impact of state

decisions on the issue of who should regulate is considerable.
On the one hand, the Schermerhorn formula prescribes a limited
range of competence within which a state court may decide to intervene in a labor dispute on the basis of a right-to-work law. 49 On
the other hand, the content of right-to-work legislation pulls in the
opposite direction without regard to the limited phrasing of section
14 (b), or the narrow construction placed on that section by the
Supreme Court. In terms, section 14 (b) authorizes the states to
prohibit "the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment."5 ° Yet
a reading of the various right-to-work laws compels the conclusion
that the states have used the authority- conferred by this section to
make labor policy that reaches far beyond the mere prohibition of
membership agreements. 5 ' In fact, the subject of agreement would
"The timing of state intervention is significant because injunctive relief is frequently sought in right-to-work cases. As one commentator has observed, "even the
temporary quelling of concerted activity may have a conclusive practical effect on the
denouement of a labor dispute, an effect which cannot be corrected by a subsequent
discovery that the sanction was erroneously imposed." Michelman, supra note 7, at'
649.
,9 State jurisdiction, recognized by § 14 (b), "begins only with actual negotiation and
execution" of the type of agreement described therein. 875 U.S. at 105 (emphasis in
original).
50 29 U.S.C. § 164 (b) (1964). Most right-to-work statutes are applicable to instances
of discrimination on account of union membership as well as non-membership. See, e.g.,
Willard v. Huffman, 250 N.C. 396, 109 S.E.2d 283, cert. denied, 861 U.S. 893 (1959),
which sustains a damage award for a discharge resulting from a failure to abstain from
union organizational activities.
51 See notes 55-57 infra and accompanying text. The degree to which a right-towork law regulates labor relations as such is indicated by provisions which appear
to make individual bargaining superior to collective bargaining. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-201 (1960) provides: 'Treedom of organized labor to bargain collectively, and freedom of unorganized labor to bargain individually is declared to be the public policy of
the State .... " The Texas act declares that the "inherent right of a person to work and
bargain freely with his employer, individually or collectively, for terms and conditions of
his employment shall not be denied or infringed by law, or by any organization of whatever nature." Tax. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5207a (1) (1962). The federal principle of
exclusiveness of a bargaining agent is also put in doubt in states with laws stating
that "tlhe right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account" of
union membership, and then declaring that "all contracts in negation or abrogation
of such rights" are illegal. ND. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14 (1960). One court, construing
the word "abridged" to mean "diminished, reduced, curtailed or shortened," has held
an exclusive recognition clause in a collective agreement to violate a right-to-work
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appear to operate as merely a point of departure for the supervision
of a wide range of labor practices.52 A recurring pattern in the
statutes is to phrase prohibitions in such broad and vague terms that
almost any practice inconsistent with right-to-work policy is covered.5 3 A common provision, for example, outlaws any "combination" whereby a union acquires an "employment monopoly."5 4 A
further technique is to insert clauses which expressly regulate the
organizational activities of unions55 and the use of the strike and
boycott weapons5" without regard to the framing of section 14 (b) in
terms of "agreements." The extent to which right-to-work laws
attempt to insulate employment from union influence is demonlaw. Piegts v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 228 La. 131, 81 So. 2d 835 (1955). Such
vague provisions as those contained in the above mentioned North Dakota act potenti-

ally conflict with federal legislation at various points, such as the § 8 (e) restrictions and
exemptions relating to "hot-cargo" agreements added by the LMRDA amendments. 29
U.S.C. § 158 (e) (1964). With respect to hot cargo agreements, at least one right-to-work
law contains express restrictions. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-46.6 (1) (1962).
52 The checkoff, for example, is usually regarded as a form of union-security even
though, standing alone, it does not typically condition employment upon membership.
Yet right-to-work statutes frequently regulate checkoff arrangements in ways more
restrictive than federal law. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 54-906 (1961); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 736A.5 (1950); cf. National Labor Relations Act § 302 (c) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (c) (4)
(1964). Checkoff clauses have been held unenforceable under a right-to-work law.
E.g., United Steelworkers Union v. Knoxville Iron Co., 162 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Tenn.
1958).
as In order to conclusively outlaw union-security arrangements, the South Dakota
act states that: "Any agreement relating to employment ...which by its stated terms,
or by implicatioh, interpretation, or effect thereof, diredy or indirectly denies, abridges,
interferes with, or in any manner curtails the free exercise of the right to work . .. " is a
violation. S.D. CODE § 17.1101 (2) (Supp. 1960). Any "understanding or practice which
is designed to cause or require, or has the effect of causing or requiring" a violation
of the right-to-work act is illegal. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-16-5 (1966). The phrase
"illegal conspiracy against public policy" frequently appears in such laws. E.g., Miss.
CODE ANN. § 6984.5 (b) (Supp. 1966).
5'E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, §375(2) (1958). This clause has proved highly flexible
in reaching union activities. See, e.g., Branham v. Miller Elec. Co., 237 S.C. 540, 118
S.E.2d 167 (1961).
55 "It shall be unlawful ... to compel or force, or to attempt to compel or force, any
... UTAH CODE ANN.
person to join or refrain from joining any labor union---U.
§ 34-16-7 (1953). "Any solicitation or request to join a labor organization ... accompanied by threats of injury ... . or damage to property, or loss or impairment of
present or future employment of such employee, shall be deemed a violation of this
section ...

" S.D. CODE § 17.1101 (4) (Supp. 1960).

6 or example, the Nevada act, without mentioning an agreement conditioning employment upon membership, in one section provides: "It shall be unlawful ...to compel
or attempt to compel any person ... to strike against his will or to leave his employment by any threatened or actual interference with his person, immediate family or
property." N-v. REV. STAT. § 613.270 (Supp. 1965). Arizona has a nearly identical
provision. Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1304 (1956). The South Carolina statute contains
broad restrictions on union economic weapons. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-46.6 (1962).
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strated by a clause which declares illegal the requirement that an
employee "have any connection with" a union as a condition of employment5 7
The protracted reach of right-to-work legislation creates a series
of obstacles to enlightened administration of labor law on the local
level. To begin with, the concept of right-to-work is in many respects inconsistent with the principles of free choice, majority rule,
and exclusive representation upon which the federal philosophy of
labor relations is constructed. 5s The organization of employees, even
on the basis of the political principle of majority support, obviously
restricts the freedom of the individual worker. 59 Nevertheless, national policy reconciles group and individual interests on the theory
that self-organization promotes private adjustment of the labormanagement relation through orderly collective bargaining. 0 A
right-to-work act runs counter to this objective in that it seeks, in
absolute terms, to clear away every restriction which collectivism
imposes upon individual choice. 61 Hence when state legislatures
57"No person is required to have any connection with, or be recommended or approved by, or be cleared through, any labor organization as a condition of employment
or continuation of employment." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-245.5 (Supp. 1965). The
Supreme Court of Wyoming, reasoning that a bargaining agent must necessarily have
some "connection" with non-union employees in the unit, has struck down this section
as conflicting with the exclusive representation provisions of § 9 (a) of the NLRA.
Electrical Workers Local 415 v. Hanson, 400 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1965).
1 "National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their
economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the
majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with7 his
employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests
of all employees." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
11It should be noted that the exclusive bargaining agent's statutory authority to
represent all workers in the unit does carry with it a statutory obligation to fairly
represent the interests of non-members as well as members. See Syres v. Local 23,
Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892, rezeg per cut-am 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Steele v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Although a union's breach of its duty of
fair representation constitutes an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b), United Rubber
Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S.
Oct. 10, 1967) (No. 194); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Note, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1037, preemption doctrine
does not defeat state power to adjudicate fair representation matters. See Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
0'See the congressional statement of findings and declaration of policy contained
in the preamble of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964); cf. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 332 (1944).
"1Since a right-to-work act restricts the freedom of a majority union and an employer to negotiate a union-security agreement as a part of the collective bargaining
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exercise the authority granted by section 14 (b) to regulate labor
activities ranging beyond membership agreements, the chances of
conflict between already conflicting policies are markedly intensified.
The effects of unwarranted statutory breadth are readily apparent
in right-to-work decisional law. Since state judges are accustomed
to disposing of disputes in accordance with local law, the mere existence of a state statutory provision covering the case at hand, coupled
with a concession of its violation, may be sufficient to tip the scales
against the preemption argument.8 2 Federal labor statutes afford
little guidance either as to the nature of state power or the standards
to be used in determining whether it is applicable. If a judge turns
to state law, the sweeping pronouncements of public policy contained
in a right-to-work act have substantial appeal.6 3 The failure of such
legislation to be explicit about jurisdictional limitations would also
appear to reduce the persuasiveness of preemption defenses. 64 Jurisdictional issues are not easily separated from the merits of a labor
dispute. Substantive standards of conduct, especially when legislatively declared in strong language, create a hostile environment for
the argument that a state may not apply those standards where they
are clearly violated.6 5
process, the practical effect is to curtail the exercise of rights which § 7 purports to
further in the national interest. It has been argued that this basic inconsistency in
philosophy cannot be defended on the basis of an overriding state interest. See Cox,
Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAv. L. REV. 1297, 1334-39 (1954);
Wellington, supra note 25, at 548-49.
62 There is much evidence in the cases that a finding of a violation of state law
is given substantial weight in determining the issue of jurisdiction. See cases cited
note 44 supra.
"8See, for example, the discussion of the "high policy" of a "sovereign state" in
Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome, 247 Miss. 458, 489.94, 153 So. 2d 695,
709-11, rev'd per curiam, 377 U.S. 126 (1963).
a4 Right-to-work laws generally fail to even faintly suggest that they might be inapplicable where commerce makes federal law controlling. The following provision
in the Arizona act illustrates the all-inclusive approach of such laws: "Any act or any
provision in any agreement which is in violation of this Act shall be illegal and void."
ARIZ. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1303 (A) (1956). The prohibitions of the Wyoming act are
declared applicable "notwithstanding any other law to the contrary." Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-245.7 (Supp. 1965).
85 The simple fact that a right-to-work law frequently appears as a constitutional
provision, or in a statute pitched in terms of constitutional guarantees of due process,
would appear to encourage state enforcement in the face of doubtful jurisdiction. After
exploring several possible bases of jurisdiction, one court concluded that "the Kansas
courts should have jurisdiction over the present case . . . as a means of enforcing the
Taylor v. Engineers Local 101, 189
state constitution if for no other reason ......
Kan. 137, 143, 368 P.2d 8, 12 (1962); cf. Kitchens v. Doe, 194 So. 2d 258, 259-60 (Fla.
1966) (dissenting opinion).
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The difficulties of perceiving the role of section 14 (b) in a world
of subordinating federal authority can by no means be attributed
solely to the excesses of legislative draftsmanship. The judiciary has
also demonstrated considerable reluctance to surrender the means
of controlling union economic power supplied by a right-to-work

law.18

This attitude is reflected in decisions which read section

14 (b) as leaving to the states exclusive and unfettered power to act
in union-security matters,0 7 as well as decisions which sustain state

jurisdiction by purporting to distinguish.preemption precedents on
grounds which are in fact insignificant or illusory.6 s Further evidence
of a disposition to prefer right-to-work policy can be seen in decisions
which seek to enlarge federally recognized exceptions to preemption.'" Resistance to preemption may also in part explain the relatively large number of right-to-work injunctions issued by trial
courts.70 A number of appellate court judges have openly confessed
that they do not subscribe to the view that a state is wholly without
"6An interesting subject of speculation in the right-to-work area is whedier employers have experienced relatively greater success than unions in raising the preemption defense. Compare Burris v. Electro Motive Mfg. Co., 247 S.C. 579, 148 S.E.2d
687 (1966), with Branham v. Miller Elec. Co., 237 S.C. 540, 118 S.E.2d 167 (1961), and
Friendly Soc'y of Engravers v. Calico Engraving Co., 238 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 935 (1957). See also Collins v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott, 91 Ga. App.
856, 87 SXE2d 337 (1955).
67E.g., Mitcham v. Ark-La. Constr. Co., 239 Ark. 1162, 1175-77, 397 S.W.2d 789,
796-97 (1965) (dissenting opinion); Scherer & Sons v. Ladies' Garment Workers' Local
415, 142 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1962); Pruitt v. Lambert, 201 Tenn. 291, 298 S.E.2d 795 (1957);
cases cited note 44 supra.
11E.g., Sheet Metal Workers Ass'n v. Nichols, 89 Ariz. 187, 360 P.2d 204 (1961);
Machinists Local 924 v. Goff-McNair Motor Co., 223 Ark. 30, 264 S.W.2d 48 (1954);
Taylor v. Engineers Local 101, 189 Kan. 137, 368 P.2d 8 (1962); Hattiesburg Bldg. &
Trades Council v. Broome, 247 Miss. 458, 153 So. 2d 695, rev'd per curiam, 377 Us.
126 (1963).
"E.g., Kimbrell v. Jolog Sportswear, Inc., 239 S.C. 415, 123 S.E.2d 524 (1962); Farnsworth & Chambers Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 429, 201 Tenn. 329, 299 S.W.2d 8,
reVd pen curiam, 353 U.S. 969 (1957).
70 The granting of injunctions in right-to-work cases within NLR.B jurisdiction, so
prevalent in earlier years, has not ceased since the Supreme Court clarified state power
in Scheranerhorn. See Hodcarriers Local 1282 v. Cone-Huddleston, Inc., 241 Ark. 140,
406 S.W.2d 366 (1966); Mitcham v. Ark-La. Constr. Co., 239 Ark. 1162, 397 S.W.2d 789
(1965). Even where an injunction is denied in the trial court on preemption grounds,
a considerable number of appellate courts have given controlling importance to
right-to-work policy. See Alabama Highway Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 612,
268 Ala. 392, 108 So. 2d 350 (1959); Hescom, Inc. v. Stalvey, 155 So. 2d 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963). With respect to the general labor field, one commentator has observed:
"[A]dding up the effects of ignorance and misunderstanding of the preemption doctrine,
and what in some cases seems to be a deliberate determination to grant injunctions in
spite of it, there is still, in practice, a large body of labor activity which is subjected
to state power." Hays, supra note 41, at 382.
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authority to vindicate interests embodied in local law3

1

Indeed, the

simplified test of state power set forth by the Supreme Court in
Schermerhorn II, and the limited sphere of state jurisdiction which
it produces, may be a direct attempt to counter the lack of sympathy
with preemption evidenced by state courts. The Court on at least
one occasion in recent years has strained its appellate jurisdiction in
order to deal with a right-to-work decision rendered in defiance of
preemption doctrine.72
If in fact the states are disposed to employ right-to-work statutes
as a vehicle for softening the impact of federal control, it becomes
increasingly important that Congress and the Supreme Court establish firm guidelines for the exercise of state power. The purpose
of Congress is reputed to be the "ultimate touchstone" in arriving
at a decision to preempt or not 8 Nevertheless, in light of the
fact that the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted at a time when the
seeds of preemption had only begun to take root, it cannot seriously
be urged that Congress foresaw the variety of jurisdictional problems
that have arisen under section 14 (b) as a result of the vigorous application of federal law7 4 The phrasing of this section, read in connection with its legislative history, does, however, afford some valuable guidance.
Because the first proviso to section 8 (a) (3) of the NLRA expressly
validates agreements conditioning employment upon union membership, 75 it was necessary that Congress add section 14 (b) in order to
achieve even the limited objective of permitting the states to touch
the subject of compulsory unionism in plants in commerce. 7 As
71 See Mitcham v. Ark-La. Constr. Co., 239 Ark. 1162, 1174, 397 S.W.2d 789, 795
(1965) (dissenting opinion). At least one state supreme court judge has taken the
position that Schetmerhorn contains little logic and is primarily dictum. Kitchens v.
Doe, 194 So. 2d 258, 259-60 (Fla. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
72In Construction Local 438 v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), the Court reviewed a state
order directing the issuance of a temporary injunction on the theory that, under the
particular circumstances, the temporary order was equivalent to a final order. See notes
143-46 infra and accompanying text.
73375 U.S. at 103. The inference that Congress intended exclusive NLRB jurisdiction to lie is usually drawn on the basis of the nature of the particular interests being
asserted and "the effect upon the the administration of national labor policies of concurrent judicial and administrative remedies." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967).
74The Court in Garmon observed that many preemption problems "could not
have been, at all events were not, foreseen by the Congress. Others were only dimly
perceived and their precise scope only vaguely defined." 359 U.S. at 240.
75Section 7 also contains an exemption for membership agreements "as authorized
in section 8 (a) (3)." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
70The House Report on the section that eventually became § 14 (b) makes it clear
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far as federal law was concerned, Congress was willing to accept a
compromise philosophy of union-security which outlawed the most
serious abuse of compulsory unionism, the closed shop, yet preserved
union-security to the extent of permitting arrangements which condition employment upon financial support of the bargaining agent."
The statutory pattern followed by Congress suggests that its primary
concern in section 14 (b) was to make clear that the states were not
obligated to accept even the limited form of compulsory unionism
preserved in federal law. Rather, the states were given the option to
decide for themselves whether the federal solution was palatable as
a matter of policy. This analysis is supported by the manner in which
Congress addressed section 14 (b) to the permissive language of the
section 8 (a) (3) proviso.7 8 Congress simply invited the states, if they
so desired, to enact provisions more restrictive of union-security than
federal law.
It should be clear, therefore, that the federal standards embodied
in section 8 (a) (3) are highly relevant to a determination of the
nature of state power contemplated by section 14 (b). An "agency
shop" clause-one that requires as a condition of continued employment that non-members pay to a union sums equal to fees and dues
paid by union members-has proved a useful device for exploring
the connection between the two sections. Until 1963 it was unclear
whether the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues in lieu of
actually joining the union constituted "membership" within the
section 8 (a) (3) proviso. 79 The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Genthat Congress was aware that its regulation of union-security agreements might be
understood to put such matters beyond state control: "Since by the Labor Act Congress
preempts the field that the act covers insofar as commerce ... is concerned, and since
when this report is written the courts have not finally ruled upon the effect . . . of
State laws dealing with compulsory unionism, the committee has provided expressly
•.. that laws ... of any State that restrict the right of employers to require employees

to become or remain members of labor organizations are valid, notwithstanding any
provision of the National Labor Relations Act." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 44 (1947). See also H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
1 See the review of relevant legislative history in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,
347 US. 17, 40-41 (1954), and NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-43
(1963). See also note 19 supra.
18 See generally Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations, 46 Micr. L. RFv. 593, 598-99 (1948).
19 The NLRB has never subscribed to the view that Congress intended the § 8 (a) (3)
proviso to validate only the union shop. Rather, the Board has read the proviso as
protecting lesser forms of union-security. American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800
(1952); Public Serv. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950).
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0 answered the question in the affirmative,
eral Motors Corporation,"
reasoning that the conditioning of employment upon the payment
of dues and fees is the "practical equivalent" of "membership" within

the meaning of the proviso to section 8 (a) (3).81

At the same term,

the Court went the next step in Schermerhorn I, and held that
an agency shop agreement is within the scope of section 14 (b) and
therefore subject to prohibition by a state right-to-work law.8 2 The
rationale of the decision was simply that "the agreements requiring
'membership' in a labor union which are expressly permitted by
the proviso are the same 'membership' agreements expressly placed
'8 3
within the reach of state law by § 14 (b)."
On the surface, the broad principles set out in General Motors
and Schermerhorn I would appear to operate as a major limitation
on state power to regulate union-security; i.e., section 14 (b) subjects
to state law only those agreements, or their equivalent, which are
permitted by section 8 (a) (3). One obvious consequence of this test
is that state courts, in determining whether a right-to-work law is
'applicable, are to be guided by federal standards. The state decisions
to date, however, strongly suggest that primary importance has been
given to internal standards when preemption is raised in the context
of a right-to-work law. 4 So long as right-to-work acts retain their
present form, attempts to apply such legislation in accordance with
federal criteria are likely to result in frequent instances of improper
state action and, consequently, a waste of judicial resources.
The practical implications of a failure to evaluate section 14 (b)
in its federal setting can be demonstrated in connection with hiring
s08 73 U.S. 734 (1963).
a, Id. at 748. This result was predictable in light of the Court's earlier indication
that forms of union-security other than the closed shop were congressionally included
in the predecessor to the § 8 (a) (8) proviso. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 307 (1949).
82 373 U.S. at 746. A number of states had previously construed right-to-work laws
to prohibit agency shop clauses. The authorities are collected in Electric Ry. Employees, Division 1225 v. Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 726
(D. Nev. 1962), afd, 319 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1963). One of the best state discussions of
the issue appears in Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456, cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961). See also Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631,
159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
a378 U.S. at 751. For a discussion of the types of agreements, in addition to the
union shop and the agency shop, which are encompassed within § 14 (b) see Grodin &
Beeson, State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy, 52 CAlF. L. Rlv. 95, 100.

06 (1964).
-' See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
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hall arrangements. As a matter of federal law, a non-discriminatory
hiring hall agreement-one that calls for referrals irrespective of
union membership-is valid in the absence of evidence of actual
discrimination in the operation of the hall.8 5 Conversely, many rightto-work acts expressly or impliedly outlaw hiring halls without regard
to whether they are in fact discriminatory3 6 For example, Arkansas
prohibits the denial of employment for failure or refusal to "affiliate
with" a union.87 The courts of that state have held that a hiring
hall agreement which makes a union the sole and exclusive source
of referrals violates the statute on the ground that a non-union member who registers at the union hall is thereby required to "affiliate"
with the union. 8 South Carolina would reach the same result on
the theory that any attempt to affect employment through clearance
or referral by a union necessarily contravenes right-to-work policy. 9
The reasoning of these decisions is significant when assessed in
conjunction with the proposition that section 14 (b) can prohibit
only what the section 8 (a) (8) proviso allows. As a matter of federal
law, the validity of a hiring hall agreement, non-discriminatory on
its face, does not depend on compliance with the requirements of
that proviso.90 Thus it should be appreciated that state regulation of
hiring halls in commerce amounts to a bold enlargement of section
14 (b).
The first occasion for a federal court to consider the problem
arose from the refusal of a multi-employer group to bargain about
a hiring hall proposal. The employers took the position that such
a clause was illegal under the Texas right-to-work law. 91 A state
85 Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 865 U.S. 667 (1961).
"eSee, for example, the Wyoming provision on hiring halls set out in note 57 supra.
As a practical matter, nearly every right-to-work act is phrased in sufficiently broad
terms
8 to encompass hiring hall arrangements.
7ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-202 (1960).
88 Kaiser v. Price-Fewell, Inc., 235 Ark. 295, 359 S.W.2d 449 (1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 955 (1963). A proposal that a union will supply workmen "at the request"
of a contractor apparently does not constitute "affiliation" within the meaning of the
Arkansas statute. Williams v. Arthur J. Arney Co., 240 Ark. 157, 398 S.W.2d 515 (1966).
Other state
88 Branham v. Miller Elec. Co., 237 S.C. 540, 118 S.E.2d 167 (1961).
courts have interpreted hiring hall proposals as designed to accomplish objectives forbidden by right-to-work policy. E.g., Building Trades Council v. Bonito, 71 Nev. 84,
280 P.2d 295 (1955); Sheet Metal Workers Local 175 v. Walker, 236 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951).
00 Since a non-discriminatory hiring hall does not, by definition, require union membership as a condition of referral, and thus employment, it is not a form of unionwithin the § 8 (a) (3) proviso.
security
9 1 The Texas act prohibits the denial of employment "on account of membership
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court found the proposed clause unlawful and enjoined a strike called
by the union in support of its contract demands,9 2 even though the
case was clearly within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. The union
thereupon filed with the Board a section 8 (a) (5) refusal-to-bargain
charge, which was sustained on two theories: (1) federal law makes
a non-discriminatory hiring hall a mandatory subject of bargaining,
and (2) such an arrangement is not a form of union-security under
the section 8 (a) (3) proviso, and hence is not subjected to state regu93
lation by section 14 (b).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board
on both theories. 94 As to the second ground of decision, the court
relied on the General Motors and Schermerhorn cases for the principle that section 14 (b) contemplates "only those forms of union
security which are the practical equivalent of compulsory unionism." 95 Although the result reached is not exceptional,90 a portion
of the court's opinion typifies the confusion which surrounds this
entire area. The analysis of the Fifth Circuit builds from the premise
that the clause in question does not constitute compulsory unionism
because actual union membership is not prescribed. Although the
agreement by its very nature may encourage membership, the court
reasoned that it still was not equivalent to compulsory unionism "so
long as the arrangement is not employed in a discriminatory manner." 97 The inference is clear that if the agreement is administered
in such a way as to discriminate against non-members, it would be
practically equivalent to compulsory unionism. If so, it arguably
follows that the green light is given state power under section 14 (b).
or nonmembership" in a union and prohibits contracts which require "applicants for
employment" to become or remain union members. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.

5207a (2), (3) (1962).
"2The court issued a temporary restraining order pending final hearing. Houston
Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v. Hod Carriers Local 18, 49
L.R.R.M. 2187 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1961).
9a Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 409
(1963).
"NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 349
F.2d 449 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1965).
96Id. at 453.

DoThe Ninth Circuit has subsequently held that a state right-to-work act cannot be
so broadly construed as to regulate a non-discriminatory hiring hall proposal. NLRB
v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 353 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1965). The decision turns on the
general theory that a non-discriminatory referral arrangement, even though it contemplates a union as the exclusive referral agency, is not the type of agreement which
was left to state regulation by virtue of § 14 (b). Id. at 771.
97 349 F.2d at 453.
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Should this line of reasoning ever gain wide acceptance, state
jurisdiction under section 14 (b) would be extended into areas subject to the exclusive remedial powers of the NLRB.9 s If the states
attempt to duplicate NLRB jurisdiction, the basic purposes underlying the decision to avoid conflict by the creation of an expert administrative agency would be frustrated. That the potential for
conflict is real is evidenced by the number and variety of occasions
in which the states have drawn on a right-to-work law to regulate
alleged discriminatory practices.P9 If the working rule is to be that
the content of section 14 (b) is determined by reference to arrangements which are federally acceptable under the section 8 (a) (3)
proviso, then perhaps the descriptive test of the "practical equivalent"
of compulsory unionism is unfortunate in that it lends itself to
expansive application. 00 Given the failure of right-to-work statutes
to reflect the prevailing philosophy of federal-state labor relations,
coupled with the slowness of state courts to adjust to preemption
teachings, predictability in the handling of section 14 (b) requires
that rules of general application be fairly precise.
PRE-AGREEMENT ActiVITIES

A policy of concurrent right-to-work jurisdiction is subject to
greatest stress in connection with concerted economic pressure, usually in the form of peaceful picketing, which is allegedly calculated
to compel an employer to adopt employment policies contrary to
local law. Schermerhorn II reaffirms the view that picketing to
induce an employer to hire all-union labor is exclusively a federal
08 See notes 168-73 infra and accompanying text. The possibility that state intrusions
into the area of NLRB jurisdiction can or will be corrected on appeal offers little
assurance that the resulting harm to federal policy will in fact be undone. The record
of state appellate courts in right-to-work cases subject to preemption reveals many inconsistencies. Case-by-case review by the Supreme Court is simply not feasible, and involves a fragmentary "rear guard" kind of process. See Gregory, Federal or State
Control of Concerted Union Activities, 46 VA. L. RFv. 539, 560-62 (1960).
91See Grodin & Beeson, supra note 83, at 107-08. Since right-to-work is essentially
a problem of discrimination, and § 8 (a) (3) and § 8 (b) (2) are primarily concerned with
discriminatory practices, conflict between federal and state law is inescapable.
100 Difficulties in administering the Schermerhorn I test of state power may be encountered by reason of the broad language used by the Court to sustain a narrow exception to preemption doctrine. For example, the Court envisioned § 14 (b) as manifesting congressional intent to "abandon any search for uniformity" and to "suffer
a medley of attitudes and philosophies" on the subject of union-security. 375 U.S. at
104-05. At another point the Court stated "we can only assume that it [Congress]
intended to leave unaffected the power to enforce those laws." 375 U.S. at 102; accord,
Kitchens v. Doe, 194 So. 2d 258, 260 (Fla. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
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matter even though the activity clearly violates a right-to-work law.' 01
Hence state courts are preempted of jurisdiction to enjoin such conduct under section 14 (b), or award damages for consequential
i ' 0 2 but must defer to the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB.
harm,
The denial of state power to regulate antecedent pressures has been
criticized as being inconsistent with the policy and legislative history
of section 14 (b).10 Since that section in terms preserves state laws
proscribing union-security agreements, it is argued that the grant of
power is meaningless unless the states are free to deal with economic
pressure designed to produce unlawful agreements. 04 Such criticism
has merit only if the record of state regulation of concerted activity
relating to union-security warrants a conclusion that dominant federal objectives can be realized when the states are free to apply their
own laws to antecedent pressures.
The unevenness of state regulation of concerted employee activity
stems primarily from a failure to grasp the idea that the involvement
10

o Any thought that Schermerhorn II is merely dictum on the issue of state power
to regulate picketing under § 14 (b) has subsequently been put to rest by the Court in
Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome Co., 377 U.S. 126 (1964). In that
case picketing was employed to force a contractor to execute an agreement whereby only
workers referred by defendant unions would be hired. The Supreme Court of Mississippi
affnrmed an injunction against the picketing on the ground it was designed to attain an
objective forbidden by the right-to-work act. Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v.
Broome, 247 Miss. 458, 153 So. 2d 695 (1963). The Supreme Court reversed, per curiam,
on the theory that, since the union's activities were arguably an unfair labor practice,
the state court had no jurisdiction under Garmon. The effect of the decision is that
peaceful picketing designed to secure agreements violating right-to-work laws is placed
beyond the reach of state cognizance.
10
2 See note 121 infra and accompanying text.
2o3E.g., Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations (pts. I & II), 59 COLUM. L. Rv. 6, 269 (1959). Rather than permitting the
states to enjoin coercive picketing aimed at instituting a union-security agreement, it
has been suggested that state courts should be permitted to award damages after
the NLRB has determined that the picketing is an unfair labor practice. Michelman,
State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARv. L. RV. 641, 679-80
(1961). The impact of a state damage remedy on national labor policy is discussed in
Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. Rav.
1057, 1064-69 (1958). A major consideration bearing on state power to award damages
under right-to-work acts should be the heroic proportions of such verdicts. For example, in one case compensatory damages of $15,000 and punitive damages of $35,000
were awarded an employee who claimed he was denied employment by reason of compulsory unionism. Sheet Metal Workers Union v. Nichols, 89 Ariz. 187, 188, 360 P.2d
204, 205 (1961). The judgment was later reversed for failure to prove a conspiracy to
affect his employment. Id. Another court awarded $3177.84 actual and $20,000 punitive damages. Baumgartner's Elec. Constr. Co. v. DeVries, 77 S.D. 273, 91 N.W.2d
663 (1958), rev'd per curiam, 359 U.S. 498 (1959).
204 Comment, Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1958 Term, 27 U. CHI.
L. Rav. 128, 140-41 (1959); 49 MINN. L. Rav. 307, 308-09 (1964).
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of interstate commerce in a labor dispute operates as a major limitation upon the regulatory power made available to the states by
section 14 (b). The confusion originates in a group of Supreme
Court decisions which, as a matter of history, mark a retreat from
the sweeping constitutional protections accorded peaceful picketing
by the ThornhiU v. Alabama'05 decision. Beginning with Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Company, 0 6 the Court over a number of
years decided a series of cases which upheld the power of a state to
enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of some
state public policy announced by either the judiciary or the legislature. 07 Although set in the context of constitutional limitations
upon state power to enjoin peaceful picketing, these decisions generally incorporated the broad "unlawful purpose" theory; i.e., a state
may enjoin labor conduct designed to accomplish a purpose declared
unlawful by state law. 08 A right-to-work law was assimilated into
this line of cases in Local 10, Plumbers v. Graham,0 9 wherein the
Court sustained an injunction against peaceful picketing on the
ground that the fourteenth amendment does not preclude a state
from enjoining conduct carried on "with at least one of its substantial
purposes in conflict" with a right-to-work law." 0
In reality, what this group of decisions really said was that the
states may constitutionally regulate peaceful picketing in areas open
to state regulation. Nevertheless, a considerable number of courts
read these opinions as allowing the states wide discretion in the
formulation and implementation of domestic labor policy. When the
expression of public policy took the form of a right-to-work statute,
the scope of which was seldom questioned because of the enabling
effect of section 14 (b), the result was a flood of state decisions sustain100 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), is generally read as equating peaceful
picketing to constitutional guarantees of free speech.
100 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
'20 E.g., Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Building Serv. Employees, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S.
470 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
108 The theory of an illegal or unlawful purpose has a long history in the common
law of labor relations. See Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900). The
application of the theory to right-to-work cases is illustrated in Powers v. Courson, 213
Ga. 20, 96 S.E.2d 577 (1957), and Woodward v. Callier, 210 Ga. 239, 78 S.E.2d 526 (1953).
109 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
10 Id. at 201. The illegal objective of the picketing was found to be the elimination of non-union employees from a construction project. A work stoppage resulted
when a single picket appeared with a sign reading "This is Not a Union Job." Id. at
195.
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ing injunctions on a finding that the purpose of picketing was unlawful.111 The critical point is that the line of Supreme Court
authority followed by many of these injunction decisions did not
involve the doctrine of preemption at all. Since interstate commerce
was not involved in such cases as Graham, the issue of the preemptive
effect of federal regulation of picketing was never raised, 112 although
the process of foreclosing state regulation of the subject matter of
13
labor relations was well underway by the early fifties.
With the Garnerv. Teamsters Local 7761 4 decision in 1953, the

Supreme Court supplied a rationale for the ouster of state jurisdiction with respect to the peaceful picketing of an employer in commerce. Although the basis of the state injunction was not a right-towork law, the Court made clear that primary and exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate recognitional picketing was vested in the NLRB in
order to insure uniform application of federal policy and to avoid
the "conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and
attitudes toward labor controversies." 1 5
Undoubtedly the failure of Congress and the Court, at an early
date, to define preemption in the context of injunctions against
concerted activities based on right-to-work laws contributed to the
analytical unsoundness of many state decisions. Yet the far-reaching
pronouncements of Garner concerning the necessity for uniformity
in the regulation of labor relations should have had some impact
upon the right-to-work states." 6 A theoretical basis for the applica""1E.g., Self v. Taylor, 217 Ark. 953, 235 S.W.2d 45 (1950); Local 519, Plumbers v.
Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950); Texas State Fed'n of Labor v. Brown & Root, Inc.,
938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
246 S.W.2d
12
2
In Minor v. Building & Constr. Trades Coundl, 75 N.W.2d 139, 152 (N.D.
1956), the court construed Graham to mean that § 14 (b)leaves the states free to enjoin
peaceful picketing regardless of whether interstate commerce is involved.
is Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); LaCrosse Tel. Corp.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538
(1945).

"1346 U.S. 485 (1953).

115 Id. at 490. The thrust of Garner was that state jurisdiction of picketing was
totally foreclosed without regard to whether the form of state regulation actually conflicted with or merely paralleled the federal scheme. Id. at 490-91.
116Machinists Union v. Goff-McNair Motor Co., 223 Ark. 30, 264 S.W.2d 48 (1954), a
case involving an economic strike during contract negotiations, found both Garner and
the NLRA inapplicable to a situation where peaceful picketing was carried on for a
purpose in conflict with a right-to-work act. Compare Gulf Shipside Storage Corp.
v. Moore, 35 L.R.R.M. 2669 (La. 1955), with Pruitt v. Lambert, 41 L.R.R.M. 2369
(Tenn. Ch. 1957).
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tion of the preemption doctrine to section 14 (b) was supplied a few
years later in Electrical Workers Local 429 v. Farnsworth& Chambers
Company.117 After an interstate employer had rejected a demand to
employ union labor, stranger pickets appeared at his establishment.
A state court immediately enjoined the picketing. The Supreme
Court of Tennessee, finding the picketing in violation of the right-towork law, affirmed state jurisdiction to issue an injunction on the

theory that Congress had failed to manifest a sufficiently clear intent
to withdraw such "matters of local concern" from state control. 118
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and without argument or

opinion, reversed the injunction by simply citing the preemption
cases of Garner and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated.19

Since neither of the authorities cited by the Court in Farnsworth
& Chambers Company involved a right-to-work law, the precedential
value of the case may have been impaired. The inconsistent response
of state courts to the decision lends support to such an evaluation. 20
Yet the case can only be explained on the ground that section 14 (b)
does not permit the states to regulate pre-agreement activities otherwise subject to the preemption doctrine. Whatever doubts that may
have lingered after Farnsworth & Chambers Company should have
been put to rest by the 1959 decision in Baumgartner's Electric
Construction Company v. DeVries,12 ' wherein the Court explicitly
=1 353 U.S. 969 (1957).
& Chambers Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 429, 207 Tenn. 329, 335,
299 S.W.2d 8, 10 (1957). The court failed to see that the case involved conduct which
amounted to an arguable violation of § 8 (b) (2) of the NLRA.
19 348 U.S. 468 (1955). The Weber case involved a jurisdictional dispute with
secondary boycott aspects. The principal significance of the case is that a state intervened on the basis of a restraint of trade statute rather than a law dealing expressly
with labor relations. Preemption was held to apply irrespective of the ground of
intervention. See also Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
120 A number of contemporary state decisions failed to even mention Farnsworth.
E.g., Alabama Highway Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 612, 268 Ala. 392, 108 So. 2d
350 (1959). Other courts found it indistinguishable and therefore controlling in picketing cases. E.g., Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 795, 181 Kan. 775, 317 P.2d
349 (1957); Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 379, 247 N.C. 620, 101
S.E.2d 800 (1958); Wood Lathers Local 345 v. Babcock Co., 132 So. 2d 16 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1961). Still other courts remained unconvinced that Farnsworth precluded
effectuation of right-to-work policy. E.g., Sheet Metal Workers International v. Nichols,
89 Ariz. 187, 360 P.2d 204 (1961); Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome, 247
Miss. 458, 153 So. 2d 695, rev'd per curiam, 377 U.S. 126 (1964).
121 359 U.S. 498 (1959).
In a case involving picketing designed to coerce an interstate contractor into executing a union agreement, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
held that Garmon precluded equitable relief, but not an award of damages for economic
loss resulting from picketing. Baumgartner's Elec. Constr. Co. v. DeVries, 77 S.D. 273,
118Farnsworth
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extended the theoretical underpinnings of Garmon to a damage
remedy imposed by a state court under the authority of section
14 (b). In effect, DeVries declared that picketing which is not enjoinable by the states because of the operation of the preemption
doctrine, cannot provide a basis for damages in tort.
One obvious lesson of this brief sketch of the development of
preemption in relation to section 14 (b) is that the Schermerhorn
delineation of state power does not erect novel doctrine. A further
lesson is that Supreme Court decisions spelling out that preemption
preempts, even where section 14 (b) is concerned, have not controlled
state decisional law with respect to concerted employee activities.
Even since 1957, the year Farnsworth '& Chambers Company was
decided, there have been numerous state decisions awarding preventive relief against picketing on the authority of right-to-work
122
legislation.
Considerations of policy and administration would appear to tip
the scales in favor of the restrictive view of state power formulated
in Schermerhorn. Antecedent pressures directed at securing a
union-security arrangement encounter federal law at a number of
crucial points. Stranger and minority picketing by a union to compel
an employer to agree to a union-security contract is arguably a violation of section 8 (b) (2).123 Alternatively, the conduct may come
within the comprehensive restrictions imposed on organizational
and recognitional picketing by section 8 (b) (7).124 If the picketing
91 N.W.2d 663 (1958). The Supreme Court, without argument or opinion, reversed
citing only Garmon.
V2 Even though an appellate court may deny injunctive relief, as was the case in
Baumgartner's Elec. Constr. Co. v. DeVries, 77 S.D. 273, 91 N.W.2d 663 (1958), ret'd,
359 U.S. 498 (1959), the fact remains that a large number of injunctions are still being
issued by state trial courts. See, e.g., Hodcarriers Local 1282 v. Cone-Huddleston, Inc.,
241 Ark. 140, 406 S.W.2d 366 (1966); Mitcham v. Ark-La. Constr. Co., 239 Ark. 1162, 397
S.W.2d 789 (1965); Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 379, 247 N.C. 620,
101 S.E.2d 800 (1958); Wood Lathers Local 345 v. Babcock Co., 132 So. 2d 16 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
121Section 8 (b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to cause or attempt
to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of § 8 (a) (3).
29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (2) (1964). This section clearly reaches minority picketing to secure
a union-security agreement. Meat Cutters Union v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
The degree to which peaceful picketing involves the NLRA was indicated by the
Supreme Court in Construction Local 438 v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1963). See
notes 143-46 infra and accompanying text.
'"
It is an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (7) for a union: "to picket or cause
to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an
object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization . . . or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or
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encompasses neutrals, it draws into question the unfair labor practice provisions of section 8 (b) (4).125 Assuming a union has majority
status, the use of economic weapons to support demands for a unionsecurity contract prohibited by state law may constitute a refusal to
bargain in violation of section 8 (b) (3).2 6 On the other hand, an
inquiry into the facts might indicate that a federal unfair labor practice was not committed under any of these sections, but rather the
conduct was protected concerted activity within the meaning of
section 7 of the NLRA.'m
Were courts permitted to make this kind of determination, a
real possibility exists that the states would restrict the exercise of
picketing rights guaranteed by federal law. 128 Particularly is this so
where the basis of injunctive relief is a right-to-work law. As a source
of substantive law, such legislation draws heavily on common law
and equity principles which federal labor legislation long ago rejected
as incompatible with the continuing labor-management relation. 129
select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such

labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees: (A)
where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act any other labor

organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised
under section 9 (c) of this Act, (B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid
election under section 9 (c) of this Act has been conducted, or (C) where such picketing
has been conducted without a petition under section 9 (c) being filed within a reasonable
period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing- ...

Provided further, that nothing in this subparagraph (c) shall be construed to prohibit
any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract

with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual
employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver

or transport any goods or not to perform any services." 29 U.C.C. § 158 (b) (7) (1964).
See generally Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HAav. L. Rxv. 1086, 1099-1111 (1960); Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 262-70 (1959).
", 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (1964). See Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome
Co., 377 U.S. 126 (1963); Plumbers Union v. Door County, 359 U.S. 354, 356-57 (1959).
226Section 8 (b) (3) imposes on a union the obligation to bargain collectively with an
employer. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1964). Insistence upon a union-security contract
prohibited by state law would apparently violate § 8 (b) (3). See 17 STAN. L. REV. 158,
162 n.27 (1964). The applicable theory is that since there is no duty to bargain
about an illegal proposal, insisting on such a proposal is itself a refusal to bargain
collectively.
See NLRB v. Bricklayers Union, 378 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1967).
27
2 See Journeymens Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 694-95 (1963); Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 475 (1955).
128 The greatest threat against which preemption doctrine apparently guards is that
a state will prohibit activity that the NLRA indicates must remain unhampered.
Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Engr's Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181, 193 (1965); UAW
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 644 (1958).
1 The test of injunctive relief under a right-to work statute may solely be injury
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Hence a right-to-work law expands the area of enjoinable activity on
the basis of criteria in conflict with federal standards. In fact, the
basic attitude of a right-to-work law toward unions in general, 130 and
the use of such economic weapons as the picket line in particular, 13 1
assures that the consequences of picketing will vary between a state
court and the NLRB. Many right-to-work provisions, for example,
condemn picketing with a broad stroke wherever an effect of such
conduct, whether direct or indirect, is the application of pressure
in almost any form. 132
More importantly, it is doubtful that state courts are equipped to
assess the sensitive problems of picketing where it is alleged that a
or threatened injury by reason of any act in conflict with right-to-work policy. E.g.,
Aluz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1307 (1956). The broad scope of injunctive provisions in
right-to-work legislation is illustrated by the South Carolina act: "Any person whose

rights are adversely affected by any ...

assemblage or other act or thing done or

threatened to be done and declared to be unlawful or prohibited by this chapter shall

have the right to apply to any court having general equity jurisdiction for appropriate

relief. The court, in any such proceeding, may grant and issue such restraining, and

other, orders as may be appropriate, including an injunction restraining and enjoining

the performance, continuance, maintenance or commission of any such contract, agreement, assemblage, act or thing ....
The provisions of this section are cumulative
and are in addition to all other remedies now or hereafter provided by law." S.C. CODE
ANN.

§ 40-46.8 (1962). Since most right-to-work acts provide expressly for injunctive

relief, a prima facie showing of a violation of the statute may be a sufficient basis for
the issuance of an injunction. See, e.g., Ringelberg v. Local 525, Journeymen, 297 P.2d
1079 (Nev. 1965).
180 The degree of anti-union sentiment reflected in right-to-work legislation is indicated by the rather harsh remedial relief made available by such laws. The plaintiff,
in any proceeding to enforce a violation, is frequently entitled to costs and attorney's
fees, as well as actual damages. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 54-908 (1961). South Carolina
expressly provides for an award of punitive damages. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-46.8 (1962).
Many of the acts declare violations to be misdemeanors, subject to fines ranging up
to $1000 and imprisonment of not more than one year. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-212

(1966). The Tennessee act, in addition, provides that "[e]ach day that any person ...
remains in violation of any of the provisions of [this Act] shall be deemed to be a
separate and distinct offense .......
Id. Arkansas similarly makes each day of a
violation a separate offense subject to a fine of not more than $5000 for each offense.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-204 (1960). Enforcement of penal provisions is generally made the
responsibility of the local district attorney. E.g., S.D. CODE § 17.9914 (Supp. 1960).
1I Picketing is subject to express restrictions in several right-to-work acts E.g., UTAIr
CODE ANN. § 84-16-6 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-74.2 (Supp. 1966).
112 The Wyoming act provides that "[a]ny person injured or threatened with injury
by any action or conduct prohibited by this act" is entitled to injunctive relief. Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 27-245.7 (Supp. 1965). The act then declares that: "Any person who
directly or indirectly places upon any other person any requirement or compulsion prohibited by this act ... or who engages in any lock-out, lay-off, strike, work stoppage,
slow down, picketing, boycott or other action or conduct, a purpose or effect of which
is to impose upon any person, directly or indirectly, any requirement or compulsion
prohibited by this act" is guilty of a violation. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-245.6 (Supp.
1965).
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union seeks to force adherence to a union-security arrangement. In
terms of work load, the general experience of state courts with labor
matters is at best de minimis. It should therefore not be unexpected
that state judges, when faced with a complex labor case, frequently
tend to search for familiar ground by resort to general principles of
If injunctive relief is sought, this tendency finds
law or equity.1'
expression in the application of such generalized tests as "balancing
the equities" or "comparative injury."'1 4 This kind of technique not
only has little relation to the balance struck by Congress between the
competing interests of employee, union, and management, but it
encourages provincialism in labor regulation. This is especially true
in the controversial area of union organizing practices, where the
legitimacy of picketing, under both federal and state law, depends
primarily upon a determination of the object or purpose of the
picketing. Such standards lead inevitably to a subjective examina,
tion of motives prompting the decision to engage in coercive practices. The era of the labor injunction demonstrates the risks of
leaving courts at large to determine the lawfulness of labor objectives. A numerical count of the picketing cases reveals that such
risks still survive. Only occasionally have state courts failed to find
picketing not designed to achieve an objective forbidden by right35
to-work legislation.
The problems involved in permitting the right-to-work states to
concurrently regulate peaceful picketing are perhaps most clearly
illustrated in cases where a union seeks to protect area labor standards.
It has long been recognized that a central aim of collective bargaining
is the elimination of competition based on labor costs. Thus a union
may legitimately be concerned that a particular employer is undermining area standards of employment by maintaining sub-standard
218 The effect of mixing common law tests with right-to-work legislation is dem-

onstrated in Taylor v. Engineers Local 101, 189 Kan. 137, 368 P.2d 8 (1962), where
damages were awarded in a case clearly governed by Garmon.
In Electrical Workers Local 1925 v. O'Brien, 202 Tenn. 38, 302 S.W.2d 60 (1957),
18,
the court viewed the issue as one of "threatened irreparable damage" to a contractor in
permitting the picketing to continue, as opposed to "very little damage" to the union
in halting the picketing. By applying the "balance of convenience rule," the court
concluded that the chancellor had not abused his discretion in issuing a restraining
order. Id. at 44, 302 S.W.2d at 63.

181A lawful purpose was found in Carpenters Local 857 v. Todd L. Storms Constr.
Co., 84 Ariz. 120, 324 P.2d 1002 (1958); McDaniel v. Tolbert, 228 Ark. 555, 309 S.W.2d
326 (1958); and Self v. Wisener, 226 Ark. 58, 287 S.W.2d 890 (1956).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1112

[Vol. 1967:1079

conditions. 136

When picketing is employed to
wages or working
protest such conditions, cases falling within NLRB jurisdiction require the Board to apply the delicate balances struck in section
8 (b) (7).137

Since picketing generally encompasses mutiple objec-

38

and an ultimate objective of any union is to organize an
tives,
unorganized shop, it should be apparent that the problems experienced by the Board in administering this section have been both
numerous and complicated. 3 9 The difficulty, of course, lies in
resolving the question of fact as to a union's purpose or object in
picketing. 140
Right-to-work statutes make no express provision for "areastandards" picketing, and rarely are explicit about informational objectives. They simply are not oriented in terms of the federal policy
of prohibiting organizational picketing only in specified situations.
Consequently, the argument that the sole purpose in picketing is to
publicize that an employer maintains sub-standard terms and conditions of employment frequently receives a hostile reception in lower
state courts.' 41 Once evidence is presented which, standing alone,
236
E.g., Centralia Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C.
Cir.1 371966).
See note 124 supra for the text of § 8(b) (7). The section is applicable only if
picketing has an organizational or recognitional objective. If such an objective is found,
the picketing is still not prohibited unless it comes within one of three categories
specifically described. Should the picketing satisfy the terms of the third category,
sub-section (c), it may still be lawful under the "informational proviso" regardless of
the existence of an organizational or recognitional objective. See generally Smitley v.
NLRB, 327 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1964).
2&Picketing may be designed to accomplish a variety of objectives: to compel an
employer to recognize and bargain with a union, to solicit the membership of the
employer's employees, to publicize the facts of a labor dispute, to compel the employer
to assign work to a particular union, to apply pressure in support of union contract
demands, or to protest the commission of an unfair labor practice or breach of contract.
189 See generally Meltzer, OrganizationalPicketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw,
30 U. CHi. L. Rav. 78 (1962).
1 0 "Usually, the union's real motives are not articulated; only the consequences of
its actions can be accurately ascertained." Aaron, supra note 124, at 1106. The type
of fine distinctions emerging under § 8(b) (7) are suggested by the Board's present
position that picketing to protect area labor standards is not subject to the section because it does not have recognition or organization as an immediate object, whereas
picketing to compel an employer to sign an agreement to pay wages equal to those paid
under union contracts is recognitional in purpose. See Centralia Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962). As to how far a union may go in dictating specific area
labor standards see Retail Clerks Local 899, 1967 CCH LAB. L. REI'. 21,663.
U' An injunction was granted by a trial court despite the area standards argument,
and then reversed in Hod Carriers Local 1282 v. Cone-Huddleston, Inc., 241 Ark. 140,

406 S.W.2d 366 (1966).
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would support a finding that the picketing objective is condemned by
a right-to-work act, the trend in the cases is to end the search for the
existence of possible lawful objectives. 142 In practice, the fact-finding
process is largely one of evaluating the conduct in question in the
narrow context of the terms and policies of the right-to-work act
without regard to federal criteria.
The treatment of Construction Local 438 v. Curry143 in the
state courts suggests the dangers inherent in leaving the process to
inexpert tribunals. An "open shop" employer undertook performance of a construction contract which required the payment of
wages commensurate with those being paid on similar projects in
the area. There was evidence that the contractor was paying wages
below the area standard, and that he had refused a request by various
trade unions to employ union workers on the job. A single picket
appeared at the construction site with a sign stating that the contractor was violating his contract with respect to wages. When subcontractors honored the picket line, the contractor petitioned the
local court for injunctive relief. The trial judge refused to enjoin
the picketing. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed
on the ground that the picketing was for a purpose made unlawful
by the right-to-work act. 144 The finding of the trial judge that the
contractor was in fact paying non-conforming wages carried little
weight with the upper court. That court read the record as "demanding" a finding that the real purpose behind the picketing was
to force the contractor to employ exclusively union labor.1 45 As to
informational objectives, the Georgia court adopted the startling
theory that picketing a construction site as a means of imparting information is necessarily unlawful because it precipitates work stop146
pages.
The contrast between the decisional process represented in this
,12See, e.g., Hescom, Inc. v. Stalvey, 155 So. 2d 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Where
at least one objective has been found to conflict with a right-to-work law, the existence
of other valid objectives has been held immaterial. Construction Local 688 v. Stephenson, 148 Tex. 434, 225 S.W.2d 958 (1950).
I's 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
14 Curry v. Construction Local 438, 217 Ga. 512, 123 S.E.2d 653 (1962).
14
Id. at 513-14, 123 S.E.2d at 655.
148 The court apparently thought the picketing was designed to "signal" economic
pressure from organized labor. The difficulty with this analysis is that the court failed
to indicate any circumstances under which informing the public might be permissible.
See Electrical Workers Local 3, 144 N.L.R.B. 5 (1963), for an example of the Board's
treatment of the "signal" picketing problem under § 8 (b) (7) (C).
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opinion and that of the NLRB is indeed striking, in technique as well
as selection of controlling legal principles.1 47 The interest of every
union in ultimately organizing a group of employees is a fact of labor
life, to be weighed with other evidence bearing upon the question of
fact as to union objectives. This same factor, however, when weighed
by a state court, may be a sufficient basis for invoking a right-to-work
law even though a picketing union has made no demand for immediate recognition, let alone a union-security clause. 148 In fact, whenever picketing follows on the heels of a union demand that an employer grant recognition, observe union standards, or employ union
labor, it is likely that a state will construe the picketing to be a
disguised attempt to secure an agreement prohibited by state law.
The impact of these decisions on national policy would appear to
vindicate the Schermerhorn allocation of exclusive jurisdiction of
antecedent pressures to the NLRB. Since the risks of improper
action are great where an unorganized employer is the target of
picketing, the practical significance of Schermerhorn is that it
minimizes these risks by limiting state intervention to the ascertainable standard of a consummated agreement.
One consequence of applying preemption doctrine to pre-agreement activities is that employers are deprived of quick injunctive
relief against harassing union tactics. Because relief from the Board
may be slow in forthcoming, or the General Counsel may refuse
to issue a complaint' 49 or there is no way in which an employer may
elicit from the Board a clear-cut determination of whether employee
147 As a matter of federal law, area-standards picketing is permissible unless the
record in its entirety warrants a finding of a present demand for immediate recognition.
See, e.g., Raymond F. Schweitzer, Inc., 65 L.R.R.M. 1367 (NLRB 1967).
1,8 Picketing is frequently enjoined under a right-to-work law in the absence of
evidence that the union actually seeks recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent, or
demands an immediate contract. For example, in Farnsworth & Chambers Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 429, 201 Tenn. 329, 299 S.W.2d 8, revd per curiam, 353 U.S. 969
(1957), the union's sole demand, prior to picketing, was apparently that union labor
be used on a construction project. See also Burgess v. Daniel Plumbing & Gas Co., 225
Ark. 792, 285 S.W.2d 517 (1956). For a case representative of the manner in which state
courts handle the matter of picketing objectives in a right-to-work setting see Blue Boar
Cafeteria v. Hotel Employees Union, 31 L.R.R.M. 2339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
1,9 The public interest in effectuating the policies of the federal labor laws, rather
than the injury to a particular individual, is of principal concern in remedying alleged
unfair labor practices. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 n.8 (1967). The decision of
the General Counsel not to issue an unfair labor practice complaint is not reviewable
by the federal courts. Balanyi v. Electrical Workers Local 1031, 374 F.2d 723 (7th Cir.

1967).
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conduct is protected by federal law, 150 it has been urged that preemption affords an employer inadequate protection from coercive
conduct designed to force him into a violation of a right-to-work
law. 151 These arguments, though meritorious, do not appear sufficiently persuasive to justify state jurisdiction. In the first place, they
are generally applicable to all employment relations affected by preemption. The displacement of state power to regulate, in many instances, permits unions to engage in, or prolong, practices never intended to be immune from prohibition or control. 152 The question
is whether this development outweighs the harm to federal labor
policies likely to result by granting the states greater immediate control of labor activity. If the union-security area is a reliable guide,
the objective of a uniform code of industrial relations cannot be
realized by permitting concurrent state power to survive. Moreover,
it is somewhat ironic that right-to-work laws should be urged as a
means of protecting employers from union power when the avowed
policy underlying such laws is to insulate the free choice of the individual worker. Although in actual practice employers have invoked
right-to-work sanctions more frequently than employees, it would
appear unwise to further enlarge the arsenal of employers by means
of legislation not primarily concerned with that objective.
150 Although the states may now assume jurisdiction under § 14(c), see note 23
suba, there still must be "a proper determination of whether the case is actually one
of those which the Board will decline to hear," Radio Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv., Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965). Since the General Counsel may dispose of a
charge without clearly defining the nature of the activity in question under federal
law, there is a risk that a "proper determination" will not be made in all cases. See
Hanna Mining Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Engr's Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965). As a practical
matter, the states are assuming jurisdiction in cases where, on the basis of available
evidence, it appears the Board would decline jurisdiction. E.g., Vegas Franchises,
Ltd. v. Culinary Workers Local 226, 427 P.2d 959 (Nev. 1967). In order to facilitate
the exercise of state jurisdiction in appropriate cases, the Board has established
a procedure for rendering advisory opinions to state courts and agencies on jurisdictional questions. The procedure is discussed in Aaron, supra note 124, at 1095-96.
It appears to be almost never used, undoubtedly because state courts are not inclined to
consult the Board as to the limits of state jurisdiction. But see Cox's Food Center, Inc.
v. Retail Clerk's Local 1653, 64 L.R.R.M. 2042 (Idaho 1966).
16 See Kitchens v. Doe, 194 So. 2d 258, 260 (Fla. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
152 Upon the issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint, § 10 (j) of the NLRA
authorizes the Board to petition a federal district court for appropriate temporary
relief or a restraining order pending disposition of the matter. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (j)
(1964). This procedure is apparently rarely used. If the complaint issues under
§§ 8 (b) (4) (A), (B), or (C), 8 (b) (7), or 8 (e), a district court suit for a preliminary injunction is mandatory. See National Labor Relations Act § 10 (1), 29 U.S.C. § 160 ()
(1964).
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The point should not be overlooked that the new balance struck
by federal labor legislation represents an almost total rejection of
state ability to regulate the labor-management relation. 15 3 In striking
and preserving that balance, Congress was surely aware that effectuadon of federal policy could only be achieved at the expense of state
regulatory power. The argument that the states should be free to
experiment in the right-to-work area has little, if any, appeal. Legislative experimentation simply has not occurred. 154 Perhaps the
strongest argument against increasing state competence to deal with
picketing by means of right-to-work laws is that the states lack the
machinery to handle such matters on any basis other than a temporary one.'5 5 To simply enjoin picketing does not develop acceptable
standards for resolving the underlying issues in a labor dispute. Additional employer protections may be necessary; but the answer does
not appear to lie in the direction of state court injunctive relief.
THE RELEVANCE OF AN AGREEMENT

Section 14 (b) expressly places within the reach of state law "agreements" which require union membership "as a condition of employment." Schermerhorn11 interprets state regulatory power authorized
by this section to begin "only with actual negotiation and execution
of the type of agreement described by § 14(b)."' 56 If a right-to-work
law may be applied only in cases which have reached the stage of
"agreement," it is essential that some fairly precise understanding of
that concept be achieved. Otherwise, by expanding or contracting
general tests of contract formation, one court might invoke a rightto-work statute in circumstances which the Board or another court
would consider premature. The intrusion into NLRB jurisdiction
11, See Ratner, New Developments in Federal-State Jurisdiction, 15 N.Y.U. CONF.
ON LAB. 47, 49-50 (1962).
154Once a right-to-work statute is enacted, the pattern is to leave it intact regardless
of changed labor-management practices or developing case law. As to state labor experimentation in general, one commentator has concluded: "The fact remains . . . that for
the past two decades at least, social experimentation in labor-relations law has been
meager, unimaginative, and ineffective in the states, most of which lack any statutory
controls or procedures with respect to labor-management disputes." Aaron, supra
note 124, at 1095. Recent legislative trends at the state level are discussed in Smith &
Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping Labor Relations Law, 1965
Wis. L. REv. 411.
1", Practically none of the right-to-work states have a comprehensive labor code comparable to § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA. For a summary of state labor relations legislation
see Smith & Clark, supra note 154, at 421-57.
151 375 U.S. at 105 (emphasis in original).
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that would result is likely to be most pronounced with respect to
practices that occur independent of actual written agreements.
Congress has not been explicit about the nature or type of
agreements subjected to state power by section 14 (b). Nor has the
Supreme Court undertaken analysis of the matter, largely because
the cases reaching the Court, aside from the picketing cases, have
involved consummated union-security agreements in written form.
The question is a critical one because most right-to-work acts prohibit
oral as well as written agreements, and many are phrased to reach any
"implied agreement, understanding or practice" which discriminately ties employment to union membership. 157 To permit the states
to exercise jurisdiction in such cases creates a substantial danger
of interference with the federal program."' The risks of non-uniformity in the assessment of factual evidence are as real with respect
to implied arrangements as they are in connection with pre-agreement activities. Moreover, if state courts are free to resolve questions
of proof of present agreement, the flexibility of judicial standards,
plus the differences in the content and application of the various
right-to-work laws, produces an atmosphere in which legal structure
offers little guidance as to the consequences of concerted activity.
The risks of inconsistent application of the concept of agreement
in section 14 (b) are most acute in cases where an employee seeks
damages in a state court on the theory that employment was denied
or terminated because of an "agreement" in violation of a rightto-work act. Such cases in reality arise out of discriminatory practices
arguably subject to federal regulation irrespective of the finding of an
agreement. 59 The element of agreement, however, affords right157 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-16-5

(1953).

The South Dakota act illustrates the

broad area such laws attempt to occupy: "Any agreement relating to employment,
whether in writing or oral, which by its stated terms, or by implication, interpretation,
or effect thereof, directly or indirectly denies, abridges, interferes with, or in any manner
curtails the free exercise of the right-to-work . . . shall be deemed a violation of this
section." S.D. CODE § 17.1101 (2) (Supp. 1960).
15 The inconsistencies likely to result from a sharing of jurisdiction in the area of
discriminatory practices is described in Grodin & Beeson, State Right-to-Work Laws and
FederalLabor Policy, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 95, 106-08 (1964).
111Except as its provisos regarding union-security permit, § 8 (a) (3) forbids any
employer discouragement or encouragement of union membership "by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment," and § 8 (b) (2) makes it a union unfair labor
practice "to cause or attempt to cause" an employer violation. Discriminatory conduct
unilaterally practiced is within the prohibitions of these sections. NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); cf. Iron Workers Local 207 v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963);
Journeymens Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
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to-work states a basis for asserting jurisdiction over a wide variety of
activities which allegedly interfere with employment relations.1 00
Seldom is such jurisdiction premised on proof of a written unionsecurity agreement. Indeed, the mere allegation that plaintiff "is
informed and believes" that a union and employer have made an
arrangement conditioning employment upon membership is generally sufficient.161 Even where commerce is admittedly affected, and
the court concedes an arguable violation of federal law, state jurisdiction has been hinged on vague allegations of a "conspiracy" to
enforce compulsory unionism.1 62 Use of the conspiracy label to
accommodate state and federal jurisdiction is particularly disturbing
because it unduly enlarges the fact-finding process and leaves to the
courts enormous flexibility in defining the content of the legal means
63
and ends of unionism.
In view of the fact that discrimination cases require expert assessment of evidence of motivation and effect on employee rights, federal policy can best be effectuated by limiting state power under
section 14 (b) to written union-security agreements.0 4 The language
of the section reasonably bears such a construction. Section 14 (b),
with obvious reference to section 8 (a) (3), is addressed to the "execution or application" of membership "agreements," while the section
8 (a) (3) proviso is phrased in terms of "making" specific agreements.
This suggests that something more formal than oral arrangements
or factual practices is contemplated by section 14 (b). Moreover,
the history of the integrated collective agreement, and its relation to
union status in the industrial unit, would suggest that the limitation
160 For example, in Building Trades Council v. Bonito, 71 Nev. 84, 280 A.2d 295
(1955), unions were enjoined from placing the name of a motel on a "we do not
patronize list" on the theory that the real objective of the unions was to secure an
agreement not permitted by the right-to-work act. See also St. John v. Building Trades
Council, 76 Nev. 290, 352 P.2d 820 (1960); Flatt v. Barbers' Union, 202 Tenn. 345, 304
S.W.2d 329, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957).
161E.g., Branham v. Miller Elec. Co., 237 S.C. 540, 542, 118 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1961).
112 Sheet Metal Workers Union v. Nichols, 89 Ariz. 187, 360 P.2d 204 (1961); Taylor
v. Engineers Local 101, 189 Kan. 137, 368 P.2d 8 (1962); cf. Boilermakers Union v. Lester,
62 L.R.R.M. 2797 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
103The use of a right-to-work statute to reinforce common-law principles relating
to the lawfulness of labor objectives is demonstrated in Large v. Dick, 207 Tenn. 664, 343
S.W.2d 693 (1960). See also Kimbrell v. Jolog Sportswear, Inc., 239 S.C. 415, 123
S.E.2d 524 (1962).
"' See Grodin & Beeson, supra note 158, at 108-09. One practical advantage in such
a restriction of state competence is that jurisdictional issues are more manageable by
local courts.
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of state power to written agreements is consistent with the over-all
policies of federal law. 16 5 The General Motors Corporation and
Schermerhorn decisions, construing section 14 (b) to subject to state
law only agreements federally permitted, provide a theoretical basis
for such an interpretation. 66 The basic difficulty with permitting
state action whenever an "executed" agreement, in whatever form, is
shown to exist is that it leaves to each state court the factual question
67
of whether execution has occurred.1
Aside from the area of potential conflict created by the pliability
of the concept of "agreement," there remains unanswered a number
of questions about the exercise of state jurisdiction even in cases involving a union-security agreement clearly within section 14 (b). Is
federal law irrelevant once it is determined that activity involves a
consummated agreement reachable by state power through section
14 (b) ? The question is significant because the execution or application of a union-security agreement may violate federal as well as state
law. 68s For example, the effectuation of a closed shop, either by
express contract or discriminatory practices, is banned by both the
NLRA 6 9 and right-to-work acts. The states have on numerous
occasions applied a right-to-work law on the ground that a closed shop
was being practiced or sought. 7 0 A union may, in addition, be a
165The NLRA in § 8(d), for example, imposes a bargaining duty to reduce to
writing any agreements reached "if requested by either party." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1964).
11OAt least one state court has construed Schermerhorn to preclude state jurisdiction until a union-security agreement is actually signed by a union and employer.
Painters Local 567 v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 81 Nev. 1, 398 P.2d 245 (1965). This approach is evident in some of the earlier state decisions. E.g., Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg.
Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 A.2d 456, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 29 (1961).
67 In Sheet Metal Workers Union v. Nichols, 89 Ariz. 187, 360 P.2d 204 (1961), the
court treated an alleged oral agreement as executed, and distinguished Supreme Court
picketing precedents on that basis.
168 That this point is not fully understood is evidenced by the recent case of McDowell v. Clement Bros., 260 F. Supp. 817, 819 (N.D. Ga. 1966), which seems to say
that the execution of a union-security agreement can never constitute a violation of
federal law.
209See Boilermakers Local 6, 94 N.L.R.B. 1590 (1951); Meat Cutters Union, 81
N.L.R.B. 1052 (1949). The NLRB has traditionally taken a restrictive view of federal
union-security requirements contained in the § 8 (a) (3) provision. See, e.g., Argo Steel
Constr. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1959).
'70E.g., Baldwin v. Arizona Flame Restaurant, 82 Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957);
Kaiser v. Price-Fewell, Inc., 235 Ark. 295, 359 S.W.2d 449 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
955 (1963); Burgess v. Daniel Plumbing & Gas Co., 225 Ark. 792, 285 S.W.2d 517 (1956);
Self v. Taylor, 224 Ark. 524, 275 S.W.2d 21 (1951). Contra, McDaniel v. Tolbert, 228
Ark. 555, 309 S.W.2d 326 (1958); Local 802, Hotel Employees v. Asimos, 216 Ark. 694,
227 S.W.2d 154 (1950).
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party to area or nation-wide agreements which are subject to federal
law yet indirectly involve right-to-work policy. 71' A given case may
also involve both an executed agreement subject to state regulation
and independent conduct which is arguably protected or made an
unfair labor practice by federal law. This situation could arise where
a union-security agreement is supplemented by an employmentreferral arrangement which in fact practices discrimination. Union
economic weapons, such as a strike to protest employer practices,
might also be employed quite independently of a collective agreement.
If the right-to-work states are permitted to regulate any conduct
once a section 14 (b) agreement is found to exist, and state power
supercedes federal in all such cases, the result is to remove from the
operation of the preemption doctrine activity which violates federal
law. It is difficult to find in either the language or legislative history
of section 14 (b) support for the view that the states may govern conduct which is federally proscribed as an unfair labor practice. 172 To
say that the states may prohibit agreements which are federally permissible is entirely consistent with the objective of preserving the
local option to reject traditional forms of compulsory unionism.
That objective can obviously be realized without according the states
a position of full equality with federal power. Moreover, the limited
phrasing of section 14 (b), when considered in relation to the comprehensive detail of federal law, simply does not suggest that Congress
intended that parity be achieved between state and federal regulation in union-security matters. Rather, federal law manifests a clear
intent to leave unfair labor practices to the expertise of the NLRB
rather than the courts.
171

For example, an agreement between a union and an employer association may

contain "hot cargo" provisions which are construed to indirectly affect the freedom of

choice of employees of employers not a party to the arrangement. See the related cases
of Scherer & Sons v. Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 142 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1962); Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. Scherer & Sons, 188 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
Nationwide collective agreements have collided with right-to-work acts on a number
of occasions. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hixson, 174 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Lewis v.
Fentress Coal & Coke Co., 160 F. Supp. 221 (M.D. Tenn. 1958), aff'd, 264 F.2d 134 (6th
Cir. 1959). The question of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction was expressly dealt with in
such a setting in Martin v. Dealers Transp. Co., 46 L.R.R.M. 2901 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1960).
12 The legislative history of § 14 (b) reflects little awareness of the problem of enforcement of state union-security laws in such situations. See notes 76-78 supra and
accompanying text.
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Practical considerations reinforce the denial of state power in
situations involving a potential violation of federal law. It is unlikely that employers and unions in right-to-work states will put obviously
illegal union-security agreements in writing. Thus the conditioning
of employment upon membership will occur in the form of informal
arrangements or practices, or by the discriminatory application of
otherwise lawful agreements. 73 Since the essence of federal labor
law is the regulation of discriminatory practices, the Board has wide
experience in such matters, as well as established machinery and procedures. Moreover, to allow state jurisdiction with respect to the
hard factual issues of discrimination, yet deny it where an agreement
states on its face that it is not discriminatory, as in hiring halls, would
not appear to constitute a very rational allocation of power.
The decisions of the Supreme Court applying section 14 (b) have
never envisioned broad state enforcement power in union-security
matters. Numerous state courts, however, have read the Court's
opinion in Algoma Plywood & Veneer Company v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board'x 4 as establishing the proposition that once
state power is activated by section 14 (b), it displaces federal regulation. 175 Although the opinion in the Algoma Plywood & Veneer
Company case describes state power in broad language, the actual
holding affords limited recognition of state union-security jurisdiction. A state labor board, with subsequent approval of Wisconsin
courts, 7 6 had ordered reinstatement with back pay for an employee
discharged pursuant to a union-security agreement forbidden by state
law. The Supreme Court upheld state jurisdiction to afford such
a remedy on the theory that federal policy, as expressed in the Wagner
and Taft-Hartley Acts, was not so exclusive as to preclude a state
17
from remedying a discharge in an area left open to state regulation.
The fact that applicable state law imposed more restrictive requirements on union-security than federal law, rather than merely proGrodin & Beeson, supra note 158, at 107-08.
8336
U.S. 801 (1949).
273 Preemption arguments were rejected on the basis of Algoma Plywood & Veneer
Co. in Alabama Highway Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 612, 268 Ala. 392, 108 So. 2d
350 (1959), and Sheet Metal Workers Union v. Nichols, 89 Ariz. 187, 360 P.2d 204
(1961).
127Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 252 Wis.
549, 32 N.W.2d 417 (1948).
177 Since the discharge was expressly based on a state union-security statute, rather
than conduct independently discriminatory, the result was consistent with the policy of
effectuation of more restrictive local attitudes towards compulsory unionism.
173
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hibiting such arrangements, was apparently of little significance.
The relevant factor, for present purposes, was that the agreement in
question did not offend federal standards. Commerce was involved,
but the preemption issue was not pressed upon the Court, undoubtedly because preemption as yet had not achieved the level of doctrine.
In the year following Algoma Plywood & Veneer Company, the
Supreme Court demonstrated the effect of preemption on state jurisdiction to grant relief in union-security matters. The Court, per
curiam, in PlankingtonPacking Company v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board178 reversed a reinstatement order by the same state
board where the discharge was presumably in violation of federal as
well as state law. The underlying theory of the decision, as later
explained by the Court, was simply that since the NLRB was given
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce employment rights protected by
federal law, the field was closed to state regulation regardless of the
applicability of a right-to-work law. 179 The subject matter of unionsecurity was therefore brought into the mainstream of Supreme Court
decisions employing preemption as the basis of foreclosure of state
regulation of labor relations in the interest of a national system of
jurisdiction. The cases before and since Schermerhorn have not
departed from the position that section 14 (b) represents a narrow
departure from the prevailing theme of federalism. As in Algoma
Plywood & Veneer Company, the Schermerhorn agreement was valid
as a matter of federal law. And in light of the Court's insistence that,
absent "actual negotiation and execution of the type of agreement
described by § 14 (b)," conduct arguably an unfair labor practice is
governed by preemption principles, it is difficult to rationalize the
applicability of right-to-work legislation to conduct or agreements
proscribed by federal law.18 0
Assuming that federal standards are utilized, the law in its present
posture indicates that relatively few cases within NLRB jurisdiction
18 338 U.S. 953 (1950), rev'g per curiam 255 Wis. 285, 38 N.W.2d 688 (1949).

110 "Since the N.L.R.B. was given jurisdiction to enforce the rights of the employees,

it was dear that the Federal Act had occupied this field to the exclusion of state regulation. Plankington... show[s] that states may not regulate in respect to rights guaranteed by Congress in § 7." Bus Employees Division 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 390 n.12 (1951).
110If conduct arguably an unfair labor practice is not subject to state jurisdiction
in the absence of a § 14 (b) agreement, policy considerations would not appear to change
because of the presence of such an agreement. In either case, the controlling factor
is a violation of federal law.
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will arise in which state regulation on the basis of a right-to-work law
is proper.18 1 It must first be determined that the arrangement in
1 2
question involves an agreement requiring'
union membership, or
its equivalent, which satisfies the federal standards of section 8 (a) (3).
If such an agreement is found, it is still not subject to state power
under section 14 (b) unless "actual negotiation and execution" has
occurred. Presumably this means integration in the form of a
written contract. The existence of a written contract, however, does
not conclusively establish the applicability of a right-to-work law.
If such an agreement, either on its face or in its application, raises a
doubt as to its validity under federal law, the states must defer action
because of traditional preemption doctrine. In short, the states may
act only in cases free of factual issues bearing on the question of
validity of a written agreement under federal law.
If a union-security agreement clears all these hurdles, the remedial
powers of a right-to-work state are still governed by the congressional
regulatory scheme. Under Algoma Plywood & Veneer Company and
Schermerhorn, a state court may declare a union-security agreement
illegal under state law, enjoin its application, and reinstate with
back pay an employee discharged under such an agreement. Absent
the necessary agreement, state injunctive and damage relief is apparently not available.188 The theoretical impact of these limitations
is to make surplusage of a substantial portion of a right-to-work law
21 This development, in light of the broad scope of right-to-work acts, would
appear to underscore the desirability of congressional action with respect to the limited
nature of state jurisdiction under § 14 (b). If the present balance of federal-state power
in the area of union-security is to continue, some explicit guidance from Congress would
alleviate the judicial burdens in administering that balance.
282 It should be noted that the scope of most right-to-work acts is not limited to
agreements which require membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. For example, the South Dakota act outlaws any agreement which "directly
or indirectly, denies, abridges, interferes with, or in any manner curtails" the so-called
"right to work." S.D. CODE § 17.1101 (2) (Supp. 1960).
'18 Since state power is not activated until "actual negotiation and execution," it
would seem to follow that the right-to-work states may not enjoin union demands to
negotiate a union-security agreement. Cf. NLRB v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
293 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. White Constr. & Eng'r Co., 204 F.2d 950, 953
(5th Cir. 1953). A difficult question that remains unsettled is whether a state may
enjoin economic action allegedly designed to secure compliance with a written agreement clearly subject to state prohibition. If the union objective appears to be solely
the enforcement of an illegal agreement, the denial of state jurisdiction would be difficult to support. However, if there exists a disputed factual issue as to the purposes
underlying a strike or picketing, the mere fact that an agreement within § 14 (b) exists
would not, standing alone, justify state preventive relief.
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Whether state courts share this

CONCLUSION

Congress, with rare exceptions, has been content to leave to the
Supreme Court the task of defining the extent to which the states may
concurrently regulate areas of labor relations already subject, in whole
or in part, to federal control. The Court in a long line of decisions
has exercised that authority in a manner which confirms the power of
the federal government to establish and apply a uniform and exclusive national law of labor relations. The Court's narrow reading
of the legislative purpose of section 14 (b) is consistent with that
trend. As a matter of policy, the decision to restrict state jurisdiction under that section undoubtedly rests on the judgment that central interests served by preemption doctrine are endangered by rightto-work laws. If the risk of actual or potential interference with
federal labor policy justifies the use of preemption doctrine, experience with right-to-work laws would appear to vindicate that judgment.
One's final judgment about the value of right-to-work laws must
depend to a great extent upon considerations as to whether these laws
redistribute union power in any significant way. These are matters
beyond this discussion. For present purposes, however, it would
appear permissible to make the observation that if there is no real
alternative to collective bargaining, the attempt of right-to-work
doctrine to supply such an alternative only serves to agitate the competitive struggle for power between labor and management. This
friction is in turn manifested in federal-state relations with respect
to the issue of division of responsibility in labor matters.
Any attempt to resolve the right-to-work issue in terms of legal
structure must surely take into account the degree to which these
laws are currently out of step with national labor policy. So long
as right-to-work laws purport to regulate conduct which preemption
reserves for federal regulation, state courts will find it difficult to
identify and accommodate respective state and federal interests. The
fact remains that withdrawal from the states of most aspects of compulsory unionism has not been easy to accomplish in fact. The number of reported decisions to date which resist federal standards of
union-security would, at the very least, leave open the possibility
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that the states are prematurely invoking right-to-work laws to a considerable extent in unreported litigation. The crux of the problem
is that federal law decrees a complex set of principles to govern an
area in which the states, at the invitation of section 14 (b), have made
a firm policy decision to reject federal control. In addition, the rightto-work states enjoy the practical advantage of being in a position to
apply, in the first instance, their own standards of conduct. The
containment of state power, under such conditions, depends primarily
upon the exercise of judicial restraint. Restraint may not achieve the
level of broad doctrine in right-to-work states until Congress is more
explicit about residual areas of state power. Such considerations
would appear relevant to current discussions concerning the ultimate
fate of section 14 (b).

